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ARTICLES 

CHILDREN OF MEN: BALANCING THE INHERITANCE 
RIGHTS OF MARITAL AND NON-MARITAL CHILDREN* 
Browne Lewis** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
CHILDREN born out of wedlock were once the exception to the rule. They were called bastards and their rights were largely ignored. Today, 
however, having children out of wedlock has become commonplace in the United 
States. For instance, the media and the public waited anxiously for the non­
marital children of Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie as well as Tom Cruise and Katie 
Holmes to be born.1 The anticipated births received media coverage usually 
reserved for events like the presidential election and the Academy Awards.2 
However, the trend to have children without the benefit of marriage is not limited 
to celebrities. Average U.S. citizens are routinely having children out of 
wedlock. In America, at least one out of every three babies born is a non-marital 
• Most states have taken steps to remove the offensive terms "bastard" and "illegitimate 
child" from the legal landscape. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT.§ 43-1413 (2004) ("In any local law, 
ordinance or resolution, or in any public or judicial proceeding, or in any process, notice, order, 
decree, judgment, record, or other public document or paper, the terms bastard or illegitimate child 
shall not be used but the term child born out of wedlock shall be used in substitution therefore and 
with the same force and effect."). However, a few states have maintained the use of illegitimate 
child. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209(a)(2)(d) (2004) (noting that an "illegitimate child or 
his or her descendants may inherit rea! or personal property ... from the child's mother"). The 
most common term used to refer to children born outside of marriage is "child born out of 
wedlock." See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-3 (West 2006). The recent trend of calling those 
children non-marital children has only taken hold in a few states. See. e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & 
TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1998) (addressing inheritance by non-marital children). For 
purposes of this article, the term non-marital child will be used to refer to a child born outside of 
marnage. 
+• Visiting Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2007-2008; Associate 
Professor, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law; B.A., Grambling State University; M.P.A., 
Humphrey Institute of Pub!ic Affairs; J.D., University of Minnesota School of Law; L.L.M., 
University of Houston School of Law. Special thanks to Professors Elizabeth Trujillo, Bonita 
Gardner, Andrew Moore, Alice Noble and Maria Pabon Lopez for helpful suggestions; and to 
Melodee Henderson and Margaret Pensler for their research assistance. 
l. And Now, All Eyes Shift to Brangelina's Baby, CHI. SUN TIMES, Apr. 19, 2006, at 46. 
2. Id. 
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child. 3 As more and more children continue to be born out of wedlock, society 
must enact laws to protect the interests of those children. l'hcy are the children 
of men and they arc entitled to financial support both during the lives and after 
the deaths of their parents. 
Morality aside, the parental decision to have a child out of wedlock is a choice 
that can create grave legal consequences for the non-marital child. The intestate 
succession system \>...:as designed to give preferential treatment to a decedent's 
children by ensuring that they receive the bulk of his or her cstate.4 Nevertheless, 
when it comes to inheriting from his or her parents, a non-marital child is not 
necessarily created equal in the eyes of the law. In a majority of states, marital 
children must merely be born in order to inherit from their fathers. On the 
contrary, non-marital children must take additional steps to earn the right to 
inherit from their fathers. 
In the LTnited States, every person has the legal right to dispose of his or her 
real and personal property in the matter in which he or she desires.5 ()ne of the 
ways a person can ensure that his or her wishes arc carried out is by preparing a 
will.6 The probate court will distribute the decedent's property in accordance 
\Vith the decedent's will, provided that the document satisfies the state's 
attestation rcquircmcnts7 and is not successfully challenged on other legal 
3. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: Section 2. Vital Stallstics, at 
69 (2000), available at http://WW\\'.ccnsus.gov/prod/2001 pub~/statab/scc02.pdf (last visited July 18, 
2007). 
4. See Jr.~sr OUKl-.MINll"R & s l"A:-!l.EY M . .IOHANSOJ\, WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES 86 (6th ed., 
2000) ("In all juri~di1.:tions in this country, after the spouse's share is set aside, children and issue of 
deceased children take the reinainder of the property to the exclusion of everyone else.") 
5. According to DUKE:.lll\!ER & JUHA:-!SON, onginal!y it was thought that a person did not 
have u constitutional right to pas~ the person's property at deuth. Id. at 2-3 (citing Irving "!rust Co. 
v Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942) ("Rights of succession to property of a deceased, whether by will 
or by intestacy, are of statutory creation, and the dead hand rules succession only by sufferance. 
Nothing in the Federal Consntution forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even 
ubolish the pov.•cr of tcstumcntary dioposition over property within its jLJrisdiction.")). But st'e id. at 
10 ('"In Hodel v. Irv1nr;:, the Court's opinion appear~ to rest on the assumption that the right to 
transmit property at death is a separate, identifiable sllck in the bundle of rights called property, 
and, if this righr is taken av.·ay, compcnsat1on must be puid."). 
6. In the majority of stutes, in order to make a will a person mu~\ be eighteen or older and of 
,ound mind. See. e.r;:., D.C. CODE ANN.§ 18-102 (Lexi~~exis 2001) ("A will, testament, or codicil 
is not valid for any purpose unless the person making it is at least 18 yeurs of age and, at the time of 
executing or acknowledging \! as provided by this chapter, of >ound and disposing mind and 
capable of executing a valid deed or contruct "). Sound mind means that the person must have the 
rcqui~ite n1ental capacity to create a will See In re Estate of Killen, 937 P.2d 1368, 1371 (Anz. Cl. 
App 1996) ("To invulidate av.ill for lack oftestarnentary capacity, the contestant must show that 
the testator lacked at least one of the following clements: (1) the ability to kno\\' the nature and 
extent of his property; (2) the ability to know his relution to the persons who are the natural objects 
of his bounty and whose intere~l~ arc affected by the terms of the instrument; or (3) the ability to 
under~tand the nature ofthe testamentary act."). 
7. For example, the Uniform Probate Code's attestation requirement.'> arc us follow~: "(a) a 
v,;ill must be: (\) in writing; (2) signed by the testator or in the testator's name by some other 
individual in the testator·s conscious presence and by the testator's direction; and (3) signed by at 
least two individuals, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after he [or she] witnessed 
either the signing of the will as described in paragraph (2) or the testator's acknowledgment of that 
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grounds. 8 In order to make the testamentary process accessible to everyone, 
some states allow the decedent to dispose of his or her property by usinff a 
holographic will.9 Although most states have simple will procedures, 1 a 
significant percentage ofpeople die without leaving a wiU. 11 
The part ofa decedent's estate that is not disposed of by will is covered by the 
intestacy system. 12 The intestacy system is a system for the distribution of 
property after death. 13 In all fifty states and the District of Columbia, intestate 
succession is governed by a statutory scheme. 14 Under those schemes, non· 
signature or acknowledgment of the will.") UNrF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(l)-(3) (2006) 
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu.lbll/archives/ulc/upc/final2005.htm (last visited July 18, 
2007). See also Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 474.320 (West 1992) ("Every \Vill shall be in writing, signed by 
the testator, or by some person, by his direction, in his presence; and shall be attested by two or 
more competent witnesses subscribing their names to the will in the presence ofrhe testator."). 
8. Some of the grounds on which a will may be challenged include insane delusion, undue 
influence, and fraud. In order for a delusion to be insane, it must be a "belief in facts that no 
rallonal person would believe, not founded upon evidence, and not removable by evidence." In re 
Estate of Aune, 478 N.W.2d 561, 564 (N.D. 1991). In order to successfully challenge a will based 
on the doctrine of insane delusion, the person must "establish that the will was a product of the 
insane delusion and that the testator, if not laboring under the insane delusion, would have 
differently devised the property." Id. (citing Kingdon v. Sybrant, 158 N.W.2d 863 (N.D. 1968)). 
The undue influence necessary to make a will invalid is influence that "substitutes the wishes of 
another for those of the testator." In re Dilios' Wil!, 167 A.2d 571, 573 (Me. 1960) (internal 
quotation omitted). Fraud sufficient to invalidate a will occurs when the testator is deceived by a 
misrepresentation and, relying upon the misrepresentation, the testator takes an action he or she 
would not have taken but for the misrepresentation. Bohlen v. Spears, 509 S.E.2d 628, 630 (Ga. 
1998). 
9. See, e.g., NEY. REv. STAT. § 133.090 (2005) ("A holographic will is a will in which the 
signature, date and material provisions are written by the hand of the testator, whether or not it is 
witnessed or notarized. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of this State."). 
The states that recognize the validity of a holographic wills are as follows: Alaska, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
0UKEMTNIER & JOHANSON, supra note 4, at 263 n.7. 
10. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6240 (West 199 l & Supp. 2007) (statutory will form). 
11. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 4, at 71 (stating that most people die without 
leaving a will); John W. Fisher, II & Scott A. Curnutte, Reforming the Law ofIntestate Succession 
and Elec/ive Shares· New Solutions to Age-Old Problems, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 61, 72 (! 990) (noting 
that "more people die intestate than testate"). 
12. Most states have adopted the Uniform Probate Code that provides: "Any part of a 
decedent's estate not effectively disposed of by will passes by intestate succession to the decedent's 
heirs as prescribed in this Code, except as modified by the decedent's will." UNrr. PROBATE CODE 
§ 2-!0l(a) (2006) available at http://www.law.upenn.edu.lbll/archives/ulc/upc/final2005.htm (last 
visited July 18, 2007). 
13. Intestate succession statutes determine how a person's property will be distributed if the 
person dies without a will, executes an invalid will, or executes a will that only disposes of a 
portion of the person's property. JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES & 
MATERIALS 64 (2d ed. 2003). See also Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance 
Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 206-207 (2001) (noting that intestate succession is composed of"default 
rules that apply in the absence ofa will"). 
14. WILLIAM M. McGOVERN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, CONCISE HORNBOOKS: PRINCIPLES OF 
WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES 24 (2005). 
----------
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marital children have the right to inherit only if they are treated as legal children. 
In order for a child to gain the status of a legal child, a legally recognized parent­
child relationship must exist. 15 A mother-child relationship exists between a 
woman and her child regardless of the status of the child's birth. 16 Accordingly, 
all children have the right to inherit fro1n their mothers. 17 To the contrary, a 
child's right to inherit from his or her father depends upon the state's recognition 
of a father-child relationship. In all jurisdictions, under the intestacy statutes, the 
following three groups of children are classified as marital children and therefore 
have the absolute right to inherit from their fathers: (I) children born during the 
marriage; 18 (2) children conceived during the marriage who are born after the 
father's death (posthumous children); 19 and (3) children who are adopted. 20 
Consequently, if a man dies intestate, his step child is excluded from inheriting 
from him under al! intestacy statutes. 21 Two groups of children, non-marital 
children and posthumously-conceived children, fall into a gray area when it 
comes to inheriting from their fathers. These children have the legal right to 
inherit only if certain statutory requirements are met. This article addresses the 
inheritance rights of non-marital children. 
In deciding how to distribute the property of a man who dies intestate, the state 
must consider three important interests: (l) the state's interest in the orderly 
disposition of property after death; 22 (2) the non-marital child's interest in having 
an equal opportunity to inherit from his or her father; and (3) the marital child's 
interest in limiting the number of heirs in order to prevent the diminishment of 
his or her inheritance.23 
Every time the state expands the definition of "child" for inheritance purposes, 
it decreases the inheritance rights of marital children. Accordingly, state 
legislatures must balance the inheritance rights of these various groups of 
children while promoting the state's interest in an orderly probate process. An 
essential goal is carrying out the presumed intent of the decedent. The current 
intestacy system docs not achieve these goals. 
15. See fienera!ly Sol Lovas, When is a f""amily Not a Family? Inheritance and the Taxation of 
Inheritance within the Non-Traditional Faniily, 24 !DAHO L. REV. 353, 381 (1987). 
16. Martha F. Davis, l\1ale Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 
73, 87 (2003). 
17. Id. 
!8. Paula Roberts, Truth and Conseqr1ences Par/ fl: Questioning the Parernity of Marital 
Children. 37 FAM. L.Q. 55, 55-56 (2003). 
19. Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Posthumous Reproduction, 39 FA:.1. L.Q. 
579, 586-87 (2005). 
20. Melissa B. Vegter, The ""Art" of Inheritance: A Proposal for Legislarion Requiring Proof 
ofParental Intent before Posthumously Conceived Children Can Inherit from a Deceased Parent's 
Estate. 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 267, 273-75 (2003). 
21. Thomas M. Hanson, lnrestate Succession for Stepchildren: California leads the Way, but 
Has It Gone Far Enough?, 47 HASTl:->GS L.J. 257, 260 (!995). 
22. Christopher A. Scharman, Not Without My Father: The legal Status of the Posthumously 
Conceived Child, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1001, 1022 (2002). 
23. Most discussions of the inheritance rights of non-marital children do not include 
information about the in1pact those rights have on the inheritance rights ofrnarital children. 
-------------------------------
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Part II of this article briefly discusses the historical treatment of non-marital 
children. Part III explores the modem legal treatment of non-marital children, 
which consists of three distinct sections. The first section includes an analysis of 
several U.S. Supreme Court decisions setting forth the legal rights of non-marital 
children that flow from the parent-child relationship. The second section 
presents a comprehensive analysis of the manner in which the fifty states and the 
District of Columbia have dealt with the inheritance rights of non-marital 
children. Part III concludes with a section discussing the Uniform Parentage Act 
("UPA")'s attempt to give non-marital children the opportunity to inherit from 
their fathers. Finally, Part IV of this article proposes changes necessary to make 
the intestacy system more uniform, flexible and equitable. 
II. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF NON-MARITAL CHILDREN 
The adverse plight of non-marital children is part of the history of the 
American legal system. "[T]he incapacity of a bastard consists principally in 
this, that he cannot be heir to any one neither can he have heirs, but of his own 
body; for being nullius filuis, 24 he is therefore of kin to nobody, and has no 
ancestor from whom any inheritance blood can be derived."25 As this statement 
implies, non-marital children have taken a long journey from being recognized as 
bastards or illegitimate children to being classified as children born out of 
wedlock or non-marital children.26 Historically, the law and society were not 
kind to the non-marital child. Legally, the non-marital child was initially treated 
almost as a non-entity. As bastards, non-marital children had no legal rights to 
inherit from their parents.27 It took years of litigation, but the disability of 
illegitimacy was eventually removed from the non-marital child.28 
24. BLACK'S LAVI' DICTIONARY !099 (8th ed. 2004) ("the son of no one"). 
25. I W!LL!AM RLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS Of ENGLAND 447 (William S. Hein 
& Co., Inc. 1992). 
26. See H. Paul Breslin, liability of Possible Fathers. A Support Remedy for Illegitimate 
Children, 18 STAN. L. REV. 859, 865-66 (1966) (summarizing the progression of inheritance rights 
for non-marital children). 
27. Comment, legitimated Child Inherits from Father's Kin, 2 STAN. L. REV. 577, 578 (l 950). 
See also Jo-Dec Favre-Jones, Rivera v. Minnich: Paternity Suits and the Negligible Burden of 
Proof, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 803, 804 (1988) (noting that the common law refused to "consider a 
bastard lhe lawful child of its ... mother; thus, a bastard could not inherit from its mother"). 
28. Nicole E. Miller, The Best Interests of All Children. An Examination of Grandparent 
Visitation Righ1s Regarding Children Born out of Wedlock, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 179, 198-200 
( 1998). 
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Ill. MODERN TREATMENT OF NON-MARITAL CHILDREN 
A. U.S. Supreme Court Mandates 
Beginning in 1968, several cases involvinf the legal rights of non-marital 
children came before the U.S. Supreme Court.2 The cases involved a wide ran~c 
of lcfal issues, including immigration,30 financial support,31 civil procedure, 2 
tort,3 workers' compensation, 34 probate,35 and social security.36 The decisions 
propounded in those cases broadly extended the legal relationship between 
parents and their non-marital children. The holdings subsequently changed the 
legal landscape for non-marital children and influenced the enactment of state 
intestacy statutes. Judicial decisions shaped the changing legal landscape for 
non-marital children. These decisions influence the enactment of state intestacy 
statutes. 
29. for a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court cases see generally Lili Mostofi, 
Legiti1nizing the Bao-lard: The Supreme Court "s Treatment ofthe illegitimate Child, 14 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 453 (2004); Laurence C. Nolan, "Unwed Children" and Their Parents before the 
United States Supreme Court from Levy to Michael Ii.· Unlikely Par/icipants in Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. REV, 1 (!999). 
30. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 788-89 (1977); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (!998). 
31. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 615 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 535 
(1973); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 41 ! U.S. 619, 6!9 (1973); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 
91,92(1982). 
32. i'vfi/ls, 456 U.S. at 91, Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. !, 3 (!983); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 
457 ( 1988). 
33. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 69 (!968); Giana v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 39! 
U.S. 73, 73 (1968); Parham v. Hughes, 44! U.S. 347, 348-49 (1979). 
34. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972). 
35. Labine v. Vincent, 40! U.S. 532, 533 (1971); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 763 
(1977); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 261 (!978); Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 853 (1986). 
36. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 630 (!974); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 497 
(1976); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 283 (!979); Bcany v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300, 30! (Sth 
Cir. 1973), s11m1nari/y aff'd, 418 U.S. 901 (!974); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588, 589 (D. 
Conn. l972), summarily ajf"d, 409 L.S, !069 (1972); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226, 
1228 (D. Md. !972), summarily ajf'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (!972). In order to be eligible to receive 
social security survival benefits, a person must be deemed a child of the insured and meet certain 
requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2000), The definition of child comes from 42 U.S.C. § 416 
(2000). Under that statute, non-marital children who are eligible to inherit from their fathers under 
the state's intestate laws are children for purposes of receiving social security survival benefits. Id. 
§ 4!6(h)(2)(A). Non-marital children may also receive benefits if any of the following conditions 
have been met: the deceased individual "acknowledged in writing that the [child was} his or her son 
or daughter"; a court decreed the deceased individual, during his lifetime, to be the child's parent; 
or a court ordered the deceased individual to "contribute to the support of the [child] because the 
[child] was his or her son or daughter; and the acknowledgment, court order, or court decree was 
made pnor to the insured person's death." id.§ 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(l)-(Ill). Alternatively, non-marital 
children may receive benefits if the deceased person is shown "by evidence satisfactory to the 
Commissioner of Social Security to have been the mother or father of the [child], and such insured 
individual was living with or contributing to the support of the [child} at the time such insured 
individual died." id.§ 416 (h)(3)(C)(ii). 
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1. l?ecognizing the Mother-Child Relationship 
l"hc early non-marital children cases were challenges based upon the Equal 
Protection Clausc37 and focused upon the legal rights attached to mother-child 
relationship. In short, the Court had to decide whether a mother's relationship to 
her non-marital children was legally different from her relationship to her marital 
children.38 
In 1968, the Supreme Court heard two cases involving the tort recovery rights 
of non-marital children and mothers of non-marital children. Hoth cases 
involved the constitutionality of Louisiana's wrongful death statutc. 39 According 
to the statute enacted at the time, the right to recover damages was a gropcrty 
right that the heirs of the persons having a right to sue could inherit. 0 After 
applying the rational basis test, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute was 
unconstitutional for two reasons: (I) it discriminated against non-marital children 
by making them ineligible to recover for the wrongful death of their mo!her,41 
and (2) it discriminated against the mothers of non-marital children by denying 
them recovery for the wrongful death of their non-marital children.42 
37 According to the Equal Protccllon Clause, no state ~hall '"deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal prote1:11on of the laws." U.S. COKST. arnend XIV, !l 1. See also Bluitt v. 
Houston lndep. Sch. Dist., 236 F Supp. 2d 703, 734 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (delineating the legal 
standard for Equal Protection). 
38 See, e.g., Levy, 391 U.S. at 72 (finding that illcgitirnate children share the sa1ne biological 
and emotional connection ;11ith their mothers as legitimate children). See ulsu John C. Gray, Jr. & 
David Rudovsky, The C'ourl AcknowleJr;es rhe Iller;irimate: Levy v. Louisiana and (Ilona v. 
A1nerican (luarantee & Liahility Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REV. I (1969). 
39. The statute provided in pertinent part: 
Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges hirn by whose fault it 
happened to repair 1t. 
The right to recover damages to property 1:auscd by an offcn~e or quasi offense 1s a 
property nght which, on the death of the obhgee, is inherited by his legal, instituted, or 
irregular heir<;, subject to the community righb of the surviving spouse. 
The right to recover all other damages eau~ed hy an o!Tensc or qua~1 offense, if lhc in.1urcd 
person dies, shall survive for a penod of one year from the death of the deceased in favor of. 
(I) the surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either such spouse or such 
child or children, (2) the surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them, if he 
left no spouse or child surviving; and (3) the surviving brothers and sister~ of the deceased, or 
any ofthen1, 1fhc left no spouse, child, or parent <;urviving. The survivors in 'vhosc t;1vor this 
right of acl!nn ~urvivcs may al~o recover the damages which they <;U>ta1ned through the 
wrongful death of the deceased. A right to recover da1nages under the provi~1ons of this 
paragraph is a property right w·h1ch. on the death of the ~urvivor in \vhose favor the nght of 
action survived, i~ inherited by his legal. instituted, or irregular heirs, whether suit ha<; been 
instituted thereon by the ~urvivor or not. 
Levy, 391 lJ.S at 69 n.l (citing LA. C!V. ConF AKN. art. 2315 (Supp. 1967)) As used in this 
article, the \VOrds 'child,' 'brother,' 's1stcr.' 'father.' and 'mother' include a child, hrother, sister. 
fi1ther, and mother, by adoption respectively. 
40. Id at 70. 

41 Id. at 72. 

42. Cluna, 391 L'.S. at 76 
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In the first case, Levy v, Louisiana, Thelma Levy filed a \Vrongful death 
lawsuit on behalf of her sister Louise's non-marital children seeking 
compensation after their mother was killed. [n addition, the children sought to 
inherit their rnothcr's cause of action for pain and suffering.4 ' The Louisiana 
Court of Appeal affirmed the state district court's dismissal of the casc. 44 In 
reaching its decision, the appellate court interpreted the statute as limiting the 
right to inherit a cause of action to marital children only. The appellate court 
reasoned that since Louise's children \Vere non-marital, they could not take 
advantage of the benefits offered by the statute.4 ·' 
In an attempt to justify its decision, the appellate court stated that the ruling 
was necessary to promote morality and to protect the general welfare by 
encouraging persons not to have children without the benefit of marriage.46 l'hc 
Louisiana Supreme Court declined to hear the case; however, the U.S. Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.47 The Court evaluated the statute's constitutionality as 
applied to non-marital children.48 l<elying on the rational basis49 test, the Court 
concluded that the statute did not withstand constitutional muster.50 ·rhe Justices 
opined that since the purpose of the statute was to compensate children for the 
loss of their parents, the status ofthe1r birth was not relevant.51 Accordingly, the 
Court held that non-marital children were legally entitled to the same protections 
as inarital children.52 
·rhc Court set forth several reasons for rejecting the state's arguments and 
invalidating the statute. First, the Justices reasoned that the children's 
dependency on their mother for support had nothing to do \Vith their being born 
out of wedlock.53 Second, the Court concluded that tortfeasors should not be 
relieved of liabilitv for the harm they caused to t,ouise just because her children 
were non-marital. 54 Finally, the Justices determined that under Louisiana law, 
both parents were under a duty to support their non-marital children. l"hus, if 
Louise had lived, she would have been obligated to provide financial support for 
her children. The tortfeasor wrongfully caused Louise's death, thereby taking 
a\vay her ability to fulfill that duty. Accordingly, the Court held that the 
43. Le")' v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 69-70 (1968). 
44. Id. at 70. 

45 Id. 

46 Id. 

47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49 Id. The ranonal ba-;1s test is applied to ca>cs where the challenged acnvity did not 1rnpact a 
per~on in a protected class or undermine a fundamental right. Joel v. City of l)rlando, 232 F.3d 
1353, 1357(1lthCir.2000) 
50. revy, 391 U.S. at 72. 

51 Id. 

52. Id. 
53. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 lJ.S. 68, 72 (1968). 
54. Id. 
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tortfeasor should be required to meet Louise's financial obligations by 
compensating her children regardless of the status of their birth. 5 ~ 
A few months after the ruling in Lev_y, the Supreme C:ourt heard a second case 
dealing with the constitutionality of the same Louisiana statute.~6 In CJ/ona v. 
American Guarantee & Liabilitv Insurance Co.. Minnie Giana sued to recover 
damages for the wrongful death-of her non-marit~I child. 57 After concluding that 
Louisiana law did not permit a mother to recover damages for the loss of her 
non-1narital child, the Louisiana courts denied Giana's clai1n.'H When the case 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the State of Louisiana attempted to justify the 
differential treatment of parents of non-marital children by arguing that there was 
a state interest in punishing illcgitimacy.-' 9 The State maintained that by 
disadvantaging parents of illegitimate children, it \\.:ould discourage people fro1n 
having children without the benefit ofmarriage. 60 
Despite Louisiana's arguments, the Court concluded that the statute violated 
the Equal Protection Clause because no rational relationship existed between the 
state's interest and the application of the statule. 6 i l'he Court reasoned that the 
true beneficiaries of the statute, as applied, were tortfeasors and not the state. 
The tortfeasors benefited because they were allowed to injure non-marital 
children with impunity. Furthermore, the Court found no rational basis because 
the fear of not being compensated for the wrongful death of a non-marital child 
would not stop women from having children out ofwedlock. 62 
2. Recognizing the Father-C'hild Relationship 
Advocates for non-marital children rights considered the Supreme Court's 
rulings in Levy and Glona to be major victories.6 .l However, victory was short­
lived. Several years later, the Supreme Court issued a decision that appeared to 
contradict Levy and Giana. ln l.abine v. Vincent, the Court revi,,ited the legal 
rights of non-marital children. 64 Labine focused on the right of non-marital 
children to inherit from their fathers. The Court declined to extend Levy or 
G!ona to allo\v an acknowledged non-marital child to inherit from her father after 
he died intcstatc. 65 
55. Id. 
56. (Jlona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 74 (1968). 
57. Id. at 73-74. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 74-75. But 1·e<" Parharn v. Hughes. 441 C.S. 347, 358-59 (1979) (upholding ~tatutc 
that prohibited a tathcr who had not legitimized his non-marital childn;n from bnnging a wrongful 
dealh action to recover damages after she \Vas killed). 
60. (~'Iona, 391 U.S. at 75. 

61 Id. at 75-76. 

62. Id. at 75 ("It 1.vould, indeed, be farfetched to assume that women have illegitimate children 
~o that they can be compensated in damages for their death.''). 
63 HARRY D. KRAUS!', ILLEUl IIMACY. LAW AND SOCJAI. POLICY 70-71 (1971). 
64. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532. 535-36 (1971). 

65 Id. at 535. 
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The Labine case arose as a result of the following incidents. Lou Patterson 
gave birth to Rita Vincent. A few months after Rita's birth, Lou and Ezra 
Vincent executed a health form acknov-.rle<lgment that Ezra was Rita's natural 
fathcr. 6r' As a result of the acknowledg1nent, Rita had the right to claim child 
support from her father and to be a limited beneficiary under her father's will.67 
After Ezra died intestate, leaving a substantial estate, Lou attempted to have Rita 
be declared as Ezra's sole heir.68 Nevertheless, the administrator of Ezra's 
succession named Ezra's relatives as his only heirs. 69 The basis of the 
administrator's claim was a Louisiana statute that prohibited non-marital children 
from inheriting from their fathers. 70 "fhe Louisiana Probate Court ruled 1n favor 
of Ezra's relatives because even though she had been acknowledged, Rita had not 
been legitimized.71 
Lou brought her case before the lJ .S. Supreme Court arguing that the 
f ,ouisiana intestate succession scheme violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by allowing non-marital children to be treated difiercntly 
from marital children. 72 As was the case in Levy and Giana, the Supreme Court 
applied the rational basis test when evaluating the constitutionality of the statute. 
The Court determined that the statute promoted the following state interests: 
(\)the establishment, protection, and strengthening of family life; and (2) the 
regulation of the disposition of probate property. 73 ·rhe Court concluded that the 
promotion of those state interests justified treating non-marital children 
differently from marital children.74 
In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that the statute was not a 
complete bar to the non-marital child inheriting from her father. 75 1"here were 
several ways the child could have inherited. For example, Ezra could have left 
the child property in a will or married Lou to legitimize the child. Further, Ezra 
could have stated his desire to legitimize the child in his acknowledgment of 
paternity. 71' The Court distinguished this case from Levy. In Levy, the statute 
completely excluded non-marital children from the list of potential plaintiffs in 
\vrongful death actions. On the contrary, the statute at issue in Lahine, gave non­
marital children an opportunity to inherit from their fathers. 77 
Non-marital children did not have to wait long for the Supreme Court to give 
them yet another beneficial ruling. The C:ourt departed slightly from its position 
66 Id at 533. 
67. Id 
68. Id at 533-34 
69. id. at 534. 
70. Id 

71 hi. 

n Id. at 535. 

71 Id. at 538. 

74. Lahinc v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1971). 

75 Id. at 539. 

76. Id. 

n Id. at 535. 
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in Labine when it decided Wehe;' v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 78 and Gomez v. 
Perez. 79 In Weber, the Court held that dependent, unacknowledged, non-marital 
children were entitled to recover workers' compensation benefits related to the 
death of their father. 80 A few months later in Gomez, the Court decided that non­
marital children had a legal right to receive financial support from their father. 81 
In 1972, Louisiana recognized three classes of children: marital children, 
acknowledged non-marital children, and unacknowledged non-marital children. 
lJnder the state workers' compensation statute, marital children and 
acknowledged non-marital children could recover; 82 however, unacknowledged 
non-marital children could only recover if the surviving legitimate dependants 
had not exhausted the maximum allo\vable benefits. 83 For example, if a man had 
hvo marital children and two unacknowledged non-marital children, the non­
marital children could only recover if the claims of the two marital children did 
not deplete the benefits rermitted by the statute. This particular statute came into 
play in the Weher case. 8 
The Weber case arose when Henry Stokes, a man with unacknowledged 
marital children, was killed.85 Prior to his death, Stokes had marital children with 
his wife Adlay Jones Stokes. After Adlay was committed to a mental hospital, 
Stokes started living with Willie Mae Weber. As a result of that relationship, 
unacknowledged non-marital children were born. 86 At the time of his death, 
Stokes was still living with Weber and her children. The maternal grandmother 
of the marital children filed a workers' compensation claim on their behalf. 87 In 
response, the employer and its insurer impleaded Weber, who sought benefits on 
behalf of her non-marital children.xx 
·rhe marital children also sued a third party tortfeasor who later settled out of 
court. 89 The trial judge awarded the four marital children the maximum 
allowable amount of compensation. In addition, the judge awarded the non­
marital children damages. However, relying upon the workers' compensation 
statute,90 the judge limited the non-marital children's award. 91 They could only 
78 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur Co .. 406 US. 164, 165 (1972). 
79. Gomez v. Perez, 409 L.S. 535, 538 (1973). 
80. Weber, 406 U.S. at 175-76. 

8 l Gomez, 409 lJ.S. at 538. 

82 Weber, 406 U.S. at 167-68. 

83. Id. at 168. 
84. Id. at I (>4. 
85. Id. at 165. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 164-65. 

88 Wcberv. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 166 (1972). 

89. Id. at 166. 
90. LA. REV. STAl ANK. § 23:1232 (1967) provided for the distribution of compensation 
benefits as follow~: 
Payrnent to dependents shall be computed and divided among them on the following basi~: 
(1) If the \vidow or wido.,..·er alone, tlurty-two and one-half per ccntum wages. (2) If the 
.,..·ido\'o' or widower and one child, forty-six and one-quarter per centum of wages. (3) If the 
---- -------
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recover to the extent that the marital children had not depleted the maximum 
compensation bcncfits.92 The judge determined that the judgment of the marital 
children had been satisfied by the tort settlement. Conse~uently, the marital 
children disn1isscd their workers' compensation claim. 9 l"hc maximum 
compensation benefits were exhausted by the amount of the tort settlement. 
Thus, the non-marital children did not receive any money from !he workers' 
compensation judgment or the tort settlement.94 
When the Supreme Court heard the case, the constitutionality of the workers' 
compensation statutory sche1ne was under challcnge.9' The Court concluded that 
Levy was the controlling precedent because it was more factually similar to the 
case before it than f,ahine. 96 Once the Justices determined that the reasoning of 
Levy applied, the non-marital children were assured victory. 1'he Court could 
find no rational reason for treating unacknowledged non-marital children 
different from acknowledged non-marital children and marital children.97 The 
Court rejected the state's arguments that attempted to justify the differential 
treatment. For example, the Justices opined that persons \VOuld not stop having 
;vidow or widower and two or more children, sixty-five per centum of wages. (4) If one 
child alone, thirty-t\vo and one-half per ccnturn of wages of deceased. (5) If two children, 
forty-six and one-quarter per ccntum of\\·agcs. (6) If three or more children, sixty-five per 
cent um of wages. (7) Jf there arc neither widow, wi<lowTr, nor child, then to the father or 
mother, thirty-two and one-half per centum of <vages of the deceased. If there are both 
father and mother, sixty-five per ccntu1n of wages. (8) If there are nclther widow, w·idov.,er, 
nor child, nor dependent parent cnhtlcd to coinpcnsation, then to one brother or si~tcr, 
thirty-two and one-half per centum of \vagc~ with eleven per cenlum additional for each 
brother or sister in excess of one. If other dependents than those enumerated, thirty-two 
and one-half per ccntum of wages for one, and eleven per ccntum additional for each such 
dependent in ex<.:c~s of one, subject to a maximum of sixty-five per ccntum of wage~ for 
all, regardless of the number of dependcnb. 
Weber, 406 L.S. at 166 n.2 (citing L>\_ RfV. s-iAr. ANN.§ 23:1232 (1967)). 
91 Unacknowledged non-marital children were nut legally considered to be children for 
work1ncn's compensation purposes. LA. CIV. CODE Al\1J\. art. 202 (1967) read in pertinent part: 
"lllcgiti1nate children >vho have been acknowledged by their father, arc called narural children; 
tho~e who have not been ackno\\·lcdgcd by their fatlicr, or whose father and mother arc incapable of 
contra<.:ting marriage at the time of conception, or v.·ho~e father is unknown, arc contradistinguished 
by the appel\auon of bastards" Weher, 406 L.S. at 167 n.3 (citing LA. CIV. CODE AN1'i art_ 202 
(1967)). Thus, unack110\11lcdged non-marital children \\'ere treated as the other dependents 
menlloned in LA. R1·V. STAl AKN_ § 23:1232(8) (1967) and could only recover if there v.·crc not 
enough surviving dependents li~ted in the other categuncs. Id at 167-68. 
92. Id at 167_ 
93. Jd_ 

94_ Id. 

95_ Id. at 168. 

96_ Id. at 168-72. The Court also determined that the non-marital children in the ca~e at bar 

were just as dependent on their father as the non-inarital children in Levy \\'ere dependent on their 
mother. Id at 169-70 (''Moreover. in l.a/11ne the intestate, unlike deceased in the present ae\lon, 
might easily have 1nodificd his daughter's disfavored pusillon ... Such options, however, \\'ere not 
reah~tically open to Henry Stukes. Under Louisiana \av.· he could not have acknowledged his 
illcgitunate children even had he de&ired to do so." Id at l 70-71 )­
97. \Vcbcr v_ Aema Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972). 
------ ----
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sexual relationships outside of marriage just because the children of those 
relationships might be disadvantaged under .the workers' compensation systcm. 98 
Moreover, the Supreme Court dctcnnincd that, as applied, the statute was not 
rationally related to the state's need to prevent persons with questionable 
paternity from filing fraudulent workers' compensation claims.99 The Justices 
reasoned that the statute's dependency requirement would alleviate problems of 
proof. 100 Thus, because the Court's ruling did not eliminate the dependency 
r~qu_irement, '_'the state intere~t in, mini~i.zin~. firoblcms of proof [was] not1
s1gn1ficantly disturbed by [the Courts] dec1s1on.· 
Gomez v. Perez was the next Supreme Court case to address the rights of non­
marital children. In Gomez, a mother filed a petition seeking to receive child 
support for her daughter from a man with whom she had a sexual relationship. 102 
The trial court concluded that the man was the biological father of the child. The 
court also concluded that the father was required to financially support his 
daughter. Nonetheless, the court refused to order the father to pay child 
support_ Jo.> The court based its decision on the premise that a man was not legally 
obligated to support his non-marital children_ Jo 
'l"he mother challenged the court's rulings on the ground that under the state's 
common law and statutory regimes, a man had a legal duty to support his marital 
children. 105 The mother argued that the state's differential treatment of non­
marital children regarding child support denied her daughter equal protection 
under the law.J 06 The Supreme Court analyzed the case in light of its rulings in 
Levy and Weher. 107 Based on that analysis, the Court ruled that "a State may not 
invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial 
benefits accorded children genera\ly." 108 Therefore, because the state gave 
marital children the right to receive financial support from their fathers, it had to 
provide that same opportunity to non-marital children.J 09 The Court's 
determination that non-marital children had the right to be financially supported 
by their fathers to the same extent as marital children set the stage for states to 
provide full or nearly full legal equality to non-marital children under their 
intestacy statutes. 
98. Id 
99. Id. at 174. 
100. Id 

I 0 l. Id. at 175. 

102. CiomeL v. l'ere7, 409 U.S. 535, 535-36 (1973). 
103. Id. at 536. 
104. Id. 

105 IJ. at 536-37. 

106. Id. at 537. 

I 07. Id. at 538. 

I 08 Id 

109 Id 
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3. Recognizing Inheritance Rights 
It is appropriate to end this section with a discussion of two cases that illustrate 
the Supreme Court's position on the restrictions that states can place on the 
inheritance rights of non-marital children. The consistent thcn1e emerging from 
the Supreme Court cases was that a state cannot deprive non-marital children of 
inheritance rights in order to discourage persons from having children out of 
wedlock. ·rhus, the Court repeatedly struck down statutes that completely barred 
non-marital children from inheriting from their fathers exclusively because of 
their birth status. 110 Nevertheless, the Justices acknowledged that state 
legislatures should be given deference in the probate arca. 111 Thus, the Court 
permitted states to enact statutes requiring non-marital children to follow certain 
procedures before they could inherit from their fathers. 112 
In 1977, the Supreme Court heard a case involving a non-marital child's 
constitutional challenge to a provision of the Illinois Probate Act. 113 Jessie 
Trimble and Sherman Gordon had a non-marital relationship that produced a 
daughter, Octa Mona "frimble. After Dcta's birth, the Circuit Court of Cook 
County issued a paternity order finding Gordon to be her father and ordering him 
to pay child support on her behalf. A~ a result, Gordon paid child support as 
ordered by the circuit court and "openly ackno\vledgcd [Octal as his child." 114 
Trimble and Gordon lived together for four (;ears before he died 1nte:;tate, 
leaving an estate containing only an automobile. 15 The probate division of the 
circuit court identified the following persons as Gordon's sole heirs: his father, 
mother, brother, two sisters, and his half brothcr. 11 ~ The probate court refused to 
classify Deta as Gordon's heir because she had not satisfied the mandates of the 
Probate Act. 117 According to the statute, a non-marital child could only inherit 
from her father if two conditions were met to legitimize the child. First, the 
child's parents had to marry each other. Second, the child's father had to 
acknowledge the child as his child. 118 
If Deta had been a nlarital child, she would have inherited her father's entire 
estate \Vithout having to meet any criteria. "fhus, Trimble appealed the probate 
court decision claiming that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause 
because it discriminated on the basis of illegitimacy and gcnder. 119 In upholding 
the constitutionality of the statute, the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized the 
110 See Recd v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854 (1986). 

111 Id at 854-55. 

112. Lalli v. l.a!h, 439 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1978). 
113. Trimble v. (Jordon, 430 U.S. 762, 763 (1977). 
114. Id. at 763-64. 
115. id. at764. 
116. id. 
117. Id. 

118 Id. at 765. 

119. Id. The ~tatute allowed non-marital children to inherit hy intestate succes . ,ion only from 
their mothers without condition~; marital children were permitted to inherit from both their mothers 
and filthcrs wahout conditions. id. 
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strong state interests that were advanced by the statute. The statute's mandates 
enabled the state to encourage family relationships. 12° Further, the legislature 
enacted the statute to establish "an accurate and efficient method of disposing of 
property at death." 121 
The Supreme Court evaluated the statute applying a rational basis standard that 
had more teeth than the one normally applied, but it stopped short of applying an 
intermediate scrutiny test. In order for the statute to withstand scrutiny it had to 
"bear some substantial relationship to a legitimate state purpose." 122 The Court 
looked at the state's interests "in the promotion of (legitimate) family 
relationships"123 and "establish[ing] a method of property disposition." 124 
The Court determined that the restrictions placed on non-marital children were 
not the most efficient way to encourage persons to get married before having 
children. The Justices reasoned that the non-marital child had no control over the 
decision her parents made with regard to marriage. Thus, the child in this case 
did not have to suffer the legal consequences of her parent's decision. 125 The 
Court was not persuaded by the state's need to protect the integrity of the probate 
system from false paternity claims. In addressing that concern, the Court 
determined that the statute cast too wide a net because it prevented non-marital 
children with valid paternity claims from inheriting. 126 For instance, in the case 
at issue, Deta could not inherit under the statute even though she had a valid 
paternity order and a child support order from a competent court. 127 
According to the Court, the statute placed an exceptional burden on the non­
marital child. Even if the father acknowledged the child, the child could not 
inherit unless the child's parents married. The Court felt that this two-step 
requirement made it virtually impossible for non-marital child to inherit. In 
essence, the state was barring non-marital children from inheriting from their 
fathers. Since the Court had condemned that practice in previous decisions, it 
easily decided that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. 128 
In a case decided a year after Trimble, the Court was again confronted with a 
statute that placed restrictions on the inheritance rights of non-marital children. 
Mario Lalli died intestate. His widow, Rosamond Lalli, was subsequently 
appointed administratrix of his estate. 129 Then, Robert Lalli filed a petition 
claiming that his sister, Maureen Lalli, and he were Mario's non-marital 
120. Id. at 768. 
121. Id. at 766. See also id. at 770 (stating that the Illinois Supreme Court held that a state has 
an "interest in 'establishing a method of property disposition'" (citing In re Karas' Estate, 329 
N.E.2d 234, 238 (Ill. 1975))). 
122. id. at 766. 
123. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768-70 (1977). 

!24. Id. at 770. 

125. Id. at 769-70. 
126. Id. at 772-73. 
127. id. at 762. 

l28. Id. at 776. 

129. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 261 (1978). 
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children. 130 In his petition, Robert requested that they be included as heirs of 
their father's estate. 131 In response, Rosamond argued that the non-marital 
children could not legally inherit because they had not satisfied the requirements 
of the state's paternity statute. 132 
While Robert conceded that his sister and he had not met the statutory 
conditions, he challenged the constitutionality of the statutory bar on 
inheritance. 133 Robert argued that the statute discriminated against non-marital 
children because it required them to present a specific kind of proof of paternity 
that marital children did not have to provide in order to inherit. 134 He further 
contended that the proof of paternity that he submitted to the court should have 
been sufficient to entitle him to inherit. 135 
The Supreme Court used the rational basis test and found the statute 
constitutional. 136 The state legislature's main concern was to provide for the fair 
and orderly disposition of probate property by protecting against fraudulent 
claims. 137 The state wanted to make sure that the decedent's intentions were 
honored. Therefore, it gave the father of a non-marital child an opportunity to 
make sure that, if he died intestate, the child would have the right to inherit from 
his estate. 138 The Court determined that the state's interest was a substantial 
one. '" 
130. Id 

131 Id. 

132. Id. 
(a) For the purposes of this article: (!)An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his 
mother so that he and his issue inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred. (2) An 
illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his issue inhent from his 
father if a coun of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime of the father, made an order 
of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother 
or within two years from the binh of the child. (3) The existence of an agreement obligating 
the father to suppon the illegitimate child docs not qualify such child or his issue to inherit 
from the father in the absence of an order of filiation made as prescribed by subparagraph (2). 
(4) A motion for relief from an order of filiation may be made only by the father, and such 
motion must be made >vithin one year from the entry of such order. (b) !fan illegitimate child 
dies, his surviving spouse, issue, mother, maternal kindred and father inherit and arc entitled 
to letters of administration as if the decedent were legitimate, provided that the father may 
inherit or obtain such letters only ifan order of filiation has been made in accordance with the 
provisions of subparagraph (2)_ 
Id. at 261 n.2 (citing N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW§ 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967)). 
133. Id. at 262. 
134. Id. 
135. Rohen sought to establish his relationship with Mario by submitting a notarized document 
where Mario referred to him as "my son." Id. at 262-63. He also filed affidavits signed by persons 
who swore that Mario had acknowledged Rohen and Maureen as his children_ Id. 
136. Id. at 275-76. The court framed the issue as "whether the statute's relation to the state 
interests it is intended to promote is so tenuous that it lacks the rationality contemplated by the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Id_ at 273. 
137. Id. at 268. 
138. Id. at 271. 
139. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 271 (1978)_ 
-------------
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In addition, the Court gave several reasons \vhy the procedure established by 
the statute promoted that interest. 140 The Court reasoned that the process 
mandated by the statute promoted important state interests without placing an 
unreasonable burden on non-marital children. Unlike the statute in Trimble, the 
statute challenged in Lalli represented a middle ground that the Court thought 
\Vas equitable. Non-marital children were not precluded from inheriting from 
their fathers as long as they followed the statutory proccdurc. 141 ln finding that 
the statute passed constitutional muster, the Court emphasized that the procedure 
set forth in the statute protected the interests of the probate courts, 14 the non­
rnarital childrcn, 14.J and the alleged fathcr. 144 
The procedure required by the statute had the potential to limit the number of 
false claims filed hefore the court. Since the tather was alive to dispute the 
claims, persons might be reluctant to file fraudulent claims. Persons making 
false paternity accusations would probably be less likely to file those claims in 
court if they knew they had to confront the alleged father. On the other hand, if 
the father was not around to defend himself from such claims, the floodgates 
could open and the courts would be inundated. Consequently, the probate 
process would be even more expensive and time-consuming. 145 The statute gave 
non-marital children more inheritance rights than existed prior to its 
146
enactment.
Further, the courts had broadly interpreted the statute to ~ivc non-marital 
7
children the maximum chance of inheriting from their fathcrs. 1· The Supreme 
Court felt that it was important to give a man the right to present evidence 
showing that he was not the father of a non-marital child. The establishment of a 
f3ther-child relationship places numerous legal obligations on a father. As a 
result, the man should be afforded the opportunity to challenge false claims of 
paternity. l"hc scheme included in the challenged statute gave the man that 
chance by requiting that paternity disputes be resolved during his lifetime. 148 
140. Id. at271-72 
141. Id. at 273. 
142. Id. at 271 C'Accuracy is enhanced by plai.:ing paternity di~putcs in aJud1i.:ial forurn during 
the hfenmc of the fii.thcr The administration of an estate will be fai.:ilitated, and the poss1b1 lity 
of delay and uncertainty m1nim17cd. where the entitlement of an 11leg1timatc child to notice and 
participation is a matter of judicial record before the ad1ninistration commcni.:cs."). 
143. Id at 273 (noting that unlike the statute in Trimble, the ~lalute challenged in this case did 
not make a large nurnber ofnon-mantal children ineligible to inherit frorn their fathers.). 
144. id. at 271 ("requiring that the order he issued during the father's lifetime permit<; a man to 
defend his reputation against 'unjust accusations in patcn1ity claim~ . "'). 
145. id. at271-72. 
146. According to the legislative history of the statute, the New York Lcgislarure wanted to 
·"grant to illcgihn1ates in so far as prac/u;uble nghts of inheritance on a par >Ni th tho~c enjoyed by 
legitimate children· ·while protecting the important state interests [the Court] described." Id. at 
274. 
147. Id. at 273. 

148 /d.at271-72. 
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4. Recognizing the Needfor Balance 
As the above cases indicate, in order for a state inheritance statute to survive a 
constitutional attack, it must provide non-marital children with the opportunity to 
inherit from their fathers. The Supreme Court has given states substantial leeway 
in probate matters; nevertheless, any statutory scheme that expressly or implicitly 
prevents non-marital children from establishing a father-child relationship for 
inheritance purposes would likely be invalidated. However, states are not 
required to permit non-marital children to have the exact same inheritance rights 
as marital children. Non-marital children have a different legal status than 
marital children. Therefore, the key is to provide equal opportunity, not strict 
equality. 149 
In drafting a statute dealing with inheritance rights of non-marital children, 
state legislatures must avoid extremes-total exclusion and total inclusion. Total 
exclusion is not fair to non-marital children because it punishes them for actions 
taken by their parents. On the other hand, total inclusion is not fair to the fathers 
or their marital children because it permits persons to file unchallenged claims 
against the estates of deceased men. In response to Supreme Court precedents, 
states have been careful to take the middle ground. Thus, statutes in most states 
give non-marital children the opportunity to inherit from their fathers as long as 
they take the steps necessary to prove paternity. 
In keeping with Supreme Court mandate, all state statutes give non-marital 
children the right to establish a father-child relationship so they may inherit from 
their fathers. The major difference between the statutes appears to be the level of 
action that must be taken to prove paternity in order for the non-marital child to 
be eligible to inherit from his or her father. As the next section indicates, the 
statutory requirements range from simple to complex. 150 
B. State Statutory Schemes 
As previously stated, the intestacy system gives preference to children. 151 
Under most state systems, children are the primary heirs of their deceased 
parents. 152 Thus, it is critical that each state has clear criteria for establishing the 
parent-child relationship. In the case of mothers, 153 the parent and child 
149. Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias in Favor of 
Nuclear Families in American Constitutional law and Policy Reform, 66 Mo. L. REV. 527, 597 
(2001) (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 ( l 976)). 
150. MELANJE B. LESLIE & STEWART E. STERK, TRUSTS & ESTATES 23 (2006). 
151. Margaret M. Mahoney, Step/amities in the law oflntestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 917, 920 (1989). 
152. Richard Lewis Browne, Undeserving Heirs?-The Case ofthe '"Terminated" Parent, 40 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 547, 548 (2006). 
153. This excludes surrogate mothers who contribute no biological material to the creation of 
the child. 
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relationship is typically established by the process of birth. 154 In some states, the 
non-marital child is explicitly granted the right to inherit from and through his or 
her mother. 155 However, in light of the old adage "mama's baby, papa's 
maybe," 156 state legislatures must intervene to establish the parent-child 
relationship to determine the heirs of the father. When the woman and man are 
married prior to the birth of the child, the problem 1s settled by presu1nptive or 
putative statutes. 157 Consequently, the inheritance rights of marital children are 
not often in debate. In some jurisdictions, a child can become a marital child and 
be entitled to inherit after he or she is born. 158 
Nonetheless, the system becomes complicated \Vhcn a child is conceived out of 
\vcdlock. In response, all states and the District of Columbia have enacted some 
type of statutory scheme stating when a non-marital child has a right to inherit 
- - - -· ·- -------­
154 KA"I. STAf A'\'\.§ 38-1 l IJ(a) (2000) (''The parent and child relationship bcm·ccn a child 
and: (a) The mother may be established by proof of her having given hirth to the child or under this 
act."). See a!~·o S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 29A-2-l 14(c) (1997) (''The identity of the rnother of an 
individual born out of wedlock is estahli'>hed hy the birth of the child .... "). But see \VYO. STAT 
A"IN. § 14-2-501 (2005) ("(a) The 1nother-child relationship is established bct\veen a woman and a 
child by: (i) The woman's having given birth to the child; (ii) An adjudication of the wotnan's 
1natcmity; or (iii) Adoption of the child by the woman."). 
155. See, e g., 01110 REV. CODE A:-11\'. § 2 !05.17 (\Vest 2005) (''Children born out of wedlock 
shall be capable of inheriting or transmitting inheritance from and to their mother, and froin and to 
tho~c v.•hom she may inherit, or to whorn she rnay trans1nit inheritance, as if bon1 in la\vfi.Jl 
wedlock."). It n1ust be noted that, in the san1c _junsdiction, the non-marital child can only inherit 
from the child's father if the til.ther declared the child tu be hi~ heir or if the child brings a 
successli.il action tu establish the father and child relationship. OHIO REv. CODE ANN §§ 2105.15, 
J 111.04 (\Vest 2005). See also MAS~. Gr.N LA\VS ANT\. ch 190 § 5 (Wc<;t 2004) ("A person boni 
out of wedlock is heir to his mother and of any person from whom his mother might have inhcntcd, 
if living, and the descendants of a person born out of v:cdlock shall represent such pcr<;on and take, 
by descent, any estate which such pcr<;on would have taken. if living.'"). 
156. This is an old saying of unknown origin. 
157. See, e.g., N.H. ]{EV STAT. A'l'.'i. § 168-8:3(1)(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2001) ("[AJ man is 
presumed to be the father of a child if: (a) l!e and the child's mother arc or have been marncd to 
each other and the child is born during the 1narriage, or within 300 day~ after the marriage is 
terminated fiir any reason, or after a decree of separation is entered by a court: (b) flefore the 
child's birth, he and the child's mother have attempted to marry each other by a marriage 
solemnized in apparent compliance v.•1th law, although the attempted marriage is or could be 
declared void, voidable, or otherwise invalid; and (l) If the atte1nptcd marriage could be declared 
invalid only by a court, the child is born during the attempted marriage, or \Vithin JOO days after its 
termination for any reason; or (2) If the attempted marriage is invalid without a court order, the 
child i~ born within 300 days after the termination of cohabitation."). 
158. See, e.g., i\'JI. Rr.v STAT. ANN. § 168-B:J(I)(c)(l)-(J) (Lcx1sNcxi<; 2001) ("'[A] man is 
presumed to be the father of a child if: ( c) After the child's birth, he and the child's mother have 
1narried, or attempted to marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with 
law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared void. voidable, or otherv.·ise invalid; 
and ( l) I le has acknowledged his paternity of the child in a writing filed with the appropriate court 
or state agency; or (2) \Vith his consent, he is named as the child"s father on the birth certificate; or 
(3) He is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary promise or by court order."). See 
also Wis. STAI" Ar-'N. § 852.05(3) (West 2002) (stallng that a child can become a marital child ifhis 
parents marry after the child is born). 
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under the intestacy system. 159 This section attempts to analyze and categorize 
those statutory schemes by the actions a non-marital child must take to prove 
paternity. In some states, the inheritance rights of non-marital children only 
become an issue if the child is not legitimized prior to the death of his or her 
father. 160 If the parents take the steps necessary to legitimize the child, 161 for 
inheritance purposes, the child is treated exactly like a marital child. 162 
159. See. e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 852.0S(!)(a)-(c) (West 2002) ("A nonmarital child or the 
child's issue is entitled to take in the same manner as a marital child by intestate succession from 
and through the child's mother, and from and through the child's father lf any of the following 
applies: (a) The father has been adjudicated to be the father in a paternity proceeding under ch. 767 
or by final order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in another state. (b) The father 
has admitted in open court that he is the father. (c) The father has acknowledged himself to be the 
father in writing signed by him."). 
160. For instance, under the Mississippi statute, a person is only considered illegitimate ifhc or 
she has not been legitimized. Miss. CODE ANJ\•. § 91-1-15(\)(c) (2004) ('"'Illegitimate' mean~ a 
person who at the tinie of his birth was born to natural parents not married to each other and said 
person was not legitimized by subsequent marriage to said parents or legitimized through a proper 
Judicial proceeding."). See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 852.05(3) (West 2002) (providing that a child 
can become "a marital child by the subsequent marriage of the child's parents ...."). 
l61. One example of the legitimization process is the statutory scheme established in North 
Carolina under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-!0 (2005) ("The putative father of any child born out of 
\Ved!ock, whether such father resides in North Carolina or not, may apply by a verified written 
petition, filed in a special proceeding in the superior court of the county in \Vhich the putative father 
resides or in the superior court of the county in which the child resides, praying that such child be 
declared legitimate. The mother, if living, and the child shall be necessary parties to the 
proceeding, and the full names of the father, mother and the child shall be set out in the petition. A 
certified copy of a certificate of birth of the child shall be attached to the petition. If it appears to 
the court that the petitioner is the father of the child, the court may thereupon declare and 
pronounce the child legitimate; and the full names of the father, mother and the child shall be set 
out in the court order decreeing legitimation of the child."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-12 (2005) 
("When the mother of any child born out of wedlock and the reputed father of such child shall 
intennarry or shall have intcnnarried at any time after the birth of such child, the child shall, in all 
respects after such intermarriage be deemed and held to be legitimate and the child shall be entitled, 
by succession, inheritance or distribution, to real and personal property by, through, and from his 
father and mother as if such child had been born in lawful wedlock. In case of death and intestacy, 
the real and personal estate of such child shall descend and be distributed according to the Intestate 
Succession Act as ifhe had been born in lav.·ful wedlock:'). 
162. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 700.21 l4(l)(c) (West 2002 & Supp_ 2007) ("A child who 
is not conceived or born during a marriage is an individual born in wedlock if the child's parents 
marry after the conception or birth of the child.")- See also RI. GEN. LAWS§ 33-1-8 (1995) ("Any 
such child whose parents shall lav.'fully intermarry and shall acknowledge him or her as their child 
shall be deemed legitimate."); ARK. CODE ANN_ § 28-9-209(b) (2004) ("If a man has a child or 
children by a woman, and afterward intermarries with her and recognizes the child or children to be 
his, the child or children shall be deemed and considered legitimate."); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 29-18 
(2005) ("A child bom an illegitimate who shall have been legitimated in accordance with G.S. 49­
10 or 49-12 or in accordance with the applicable law of any other jurisdiction, and the heirs of such 
child, are entitled by succession to property by, through and from his father and mother and their 
heirs the same as if born in lawful wedlock; and ifhe dies intestate, his property shall descend and 
be distributed as ifhe had been born in lawful wedlock."); MASS .GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190 § 7 
(West 2004) ("A person born out of wedlock whose parents have intermarried and whose father has 
acknowledged him as his child or has been adjudged his father ... shall be deemed legitimate and 
shall be entitled to take the name of his parents to the same extent as if born in lawful wedlock."). 
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l.css than half of the states have adopted parentage acts that make the marital 
status of the parents irrelevant to a child's right to inherit from his or her 
father. 163 If a non-marital child can establish paternity in so1ne \Vay, he or she 
has the right to inherit on equal terms \Vith marital children. 164 The majority of 
states require parents of a non-marital child to take some type of atlirmative 
action before the child can inherit from his or her fathcr. 165 The main 
justifications for this type of approach include protection of the family, 
encouraging marriage, and defense of the integrity of the probate system. 166 
I. Birth Equals Inheritance Rights llnless Paternity ls Disputed 
\Vith regards to the inheritance rights of non-marital children, eighteen states 
and the District of Columbia have adopted statutes rnodeled after the UPA. 167 In 
each of those states, the non-marital child is on par with the marital child because 
he or she is legally deemed to be the child of his or her natural parents regardless 
of the marital status of the parents. 168 Thus, the non-marital child can inherit 
163. David D. Meyer, f'arenthood in a Time of Tran~1t1nn. Ten)1ons hetwefn Lfga!, Biu!ogica!. 
and Social Conceptions('.(Parenthood, 54 A'v! J. COMP. L. !25, 129 (2006). 
164. Paula A. Monopoli, "'Ueadheal Dads'. Should Support and Jnherirance Be Linked~, 49 l, 
Ml>\MI !.. Rf:V 257, 2fi3 (1994). 
165. Fur in~tancc, in Arkansa~, a non-marital child may inherit from the ehild"s father only if 
one of the follo\Ving rcquirernents are 1net: 
(1) A court of competent jurisdiction has e~tablished the paternity nf the child or ha~ 
determined the legitimacy of the cluld pursuant to subsection (a), (b), or (c), of this section; 
(2) The man has made a \Vritten ackno>vkdgment that he is the father of the child; (3) The 
rnan'~ nan1e appears >Vi th his v.titten consent on the birth certificate as the father of lhc child; 
(4) The mother and father intermarry pnor to the birth of the child; (5) The 1nother and 
putative father attempted tu marry each other prior to the birth of the child by a marriage 
solemni.-:ed in apparent compliance with law, although the attcn1pted 1narnagc is or could be 
declared invalid; or (6) The putative filther is obligated to support the child under a written 
voluntary promise or by court order. 
ARK. CODI· ANN § 28-9-209(d) (2004). 
166. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 536 (1971) (interprcllng l.oui~iana'~ intestacy lav.·s). See 
ulso 1\olan, )upru note 29. at 13 (d1scu~sing the holding in Labine). 
167 Those ~talcs are A!a~ka, Ati.1.ona, California. Colorado, Connecticut. Hawa11. Kansas, 
Michigan, Minnesota, J\.1ontana, Nevada, New Jersey, Nev.' Mexico, '\/onh Dakota, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, \\/ashington, Washington D.C., and Utah. 
168 See, e.g, ALASKA STAT.~ \3.12.114(a) (2006) ("'Except as provided in (b)-(d) ofthi~ 
section, for purposes of intestate succession by, through, or fron1 a person, an individual i~ the child 
of the 1ndiv1dual"s natural parents, regardless of their marital statu~, and the parent and child 
relationship may he c~tablished as indicated under AS 25.20.050."); CAL. !'ROil. CODb. S fi450(a) 
(We~\ 1991 & Supp. 2007) ("(a) The rclat1onsh1p of parent and child exists bct>vccn a person and 
the person's natural parents, regardless of the manta] status of the natural parents."); CONN. Gb'J. 
SrA1 Al\'\.§ 45a-438(b) (West 2004) ('"Except a~ provided in section 45a-731, for purpo~c~ of 
inte~tate succession by, through or from a person, an individual is the child of his genetic parents, 
regardless of rnantal status of such parents.") (emphasis added), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1112 
(2000) ("The parent and child relationship extends equally to C\oCfY child and to every parent, 
regardless of the manta! status of the parents."): R.l. GE:-<. LAWS§ 33-1-8 (1995) ("'A child born out 
of v.'cdlock shall he capable of inheriting or tran~mitting inheritance on the part of the child's 
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from his or her father without establishing the father-child relationship. 
However, if a situation arises where that relationship is disputed, the state has a 
statutory scheme that pcnnits the non-marital child to establish the relationship 
. h . 169
necessary to 10 cr1t. 
The UPA approach appears to be fair to all parties involved. ·rhis system 
gives non-marital children an equal opportunity to inherit from both parents. 
Thus, non-marital children are not disadvantaged because their parents chose to 
have them without the benefit of marriage. [n addition, under this approach, the 
decedent's other heirs have the right to challenge the child's right to inherit. As a 
consequence, the marital children's interests are protected from persons filing 
false paternity claim~. The integrity of the probate process is al~o protected 
because a non-marital child can be forced to prove his or her allegation of a 
father-child relationship. One deficiency of this type of statutory scheme is that 
the decedent is not given the opportunity to object to the non-marital child being 
considered his heir. Since the intestacy process is meant to carry out the 
prcsutned intent of the decedent, this omission is a significant shortcoming. 170 
Nevertheless, any negative impact from this \veakness is diminished by the 
administrator's right to object to claims against the decedent's estate. 
2. Birth Plus Simple Parental Action t.'quals Inheritance l?ights 
In most Jurisdictions, several statutory mandates must be satisfied in order for 
the non-marital child to inherit from his or her fathcr. 171 The requirements 
1nothcr and father in like manner as if burn in la\'iful 1-11edlock.. '); \VASH REV CODE A'\"N. 
§ 11.04.081 (\Vest 1998) ("For the purpose of inheritance to, through, and from 11ny child, the 
effects and treatment of the parent-child relationship shall nol depend upon whether Qr nQt the 
parents have been ntarried."); [>.C. CODE AN"i. § 19-316 (Lexi~l\exis 2001) ('"Children born out Qf 
wedlock and the heirs of children born out of wedlock are capable of taking real and personal e~tate 
by inheritance from their mother or frGm thc!f father if parcnthoGd has been C>tablishcd . . "). 
169. See COLO. R1-.v S"iAT. § 15-11-114(1) (2006) ("'The parent child rclal\Qn~hip may be 
established under the 'Uniform Parentage Act', article 4 of title 19, C.R.S."); KA"i. SlA"l As-.. 
§ 38-1113 (2000) ("The parent and child relationship bel\veen a child and .. (h) The father may he 
established under this act or, in the absence of a final judgment establishing paternity, by a 
voluntary acknD1-v!cdgrnent of paternity rnccnng the rcquirc1ncnts of K.S.A. 38-1138 and 
amendrnenls thereto. unless the voluntary acknowledgment has been revoked pursuant tQ KS.A. 
38-1115 and aincndrnents thereto."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 29A-2-l 14(c) (1997) ("The identity of 
the father may be established by the subsequent marriage of the parents, by a \\'ntten 
acknowledgment by the father dunng the child's lifetime, by a judicial determ1nat1on of patcrnay 
during the father's lifctin1e, or by a presentation of clear and convincing proof in the proceeding to 
settle the father's estate."). 
170. Susan N. Gary, The Parent Child Relationship under lnte.1tacy Statutes, 32 U. ME1'l. L. 
Rr.v 643, 651 (2002) (citing LA\\'Rl-,NC!-. W. \VAGGONER l"T Al' fAMll.Y PRUPl-RlY LA\V: CASES 
AJ\.D MATERIALS OS \\Ill.LS, TRLS l S, A'>ID FLTUR!-. l'>ITERFS IS 3 7 (3d ed. 2002)). 
171 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. Al'."\!. tit. 84, § 215 (\\le~t 1990) ("For inheritance purposes, a child 
born out of wedlock stands in the sarne relation to his inothcr and her kindred, and she and her 
kindred to the child, as if that child had been born in wedlock. For like purposes, every such child 
stands in identical relation to his father and his kindred, and the latter and his kindred to the child, 
1-vhenevcr: (a) the father, in writing, signed in the presence of a competent witness acknowledges 
htrnsclf to be the father of the child, (b) the father and mother intermarried subsequent to the child's 
------- - --- ----- ---
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imposed appear to be designed to prevent persons from disruptin,5 the probate 
process by asserting false claims against the estates of dccedents. 11 In order to 
be eligible to inherit from his or her father under such statutes, a non-marital 
child must establish a legal father-child relationship. 173 
According to those statutes, the necessary relationship may be established if 
one of the following events has occurred prior to the death of the father: (1) the 
child's mother and father engaged in a marriage ceremony; or (2) paternity was 
established by adjudication or acknowledgmcnt. 174 In some states, paternity may 
birth, and the father, after such marriage, acknowledged thc child as hi~ own or adopted hun into 
his farni!y, (c) the f:1ther publicly acknov.:lcdgcd such child as his o>vn, receiving it as such, with the 
consent of his \V1fc, if he is married, into hi~ family and othen.o"ise trcatu1g it as if it 'vere a child 
born in wedlock, or (d) the father \Vas judicially determined lo be such in a paternity proceeding 
before a court of eo1npetenl junsdietion."). See also 20 PA. Co;-.;s. STAT. ANN § 2!07(c) (\Vest 
2005) ("For purposes of descent by, from and through a person born out of \vedlock, he ~hall be 
considered the child of his father \\'·hen the identity of the father has been determined in any one of 
the follovdng ways: (I) If the parents of a child horn out of wedlock shall have married each other. 
(2) If during the lifetime of the child, the father openly holds out the child to be his and receives the 
child into his home, or openly holds the child out to be hi~ and provides support for the child which 
shall be determined by clear and convincing evidc11cc. (3) If there is clear and convincing evidence 
that the n1an \Vas the father of the child, \vhich may include a prior court determination of 
paternity."). 
172. Karen A. Hauser, JnheritunCf' Right.1 for Exlrumarital Children: 1\le•v Science Plus (J/d 
International Scn.//1nyAdd Up tv rhe ,\leedjOr C.'hanf:e, 65 lJ C1N. I.. REV. 891, 892 (1997) 
173. 5f'e. e f:., Miss. CODl-0 Al\N. § 91-l-15(3)(a)-(c) (2004) ('"An illegitimate shall inherit fro1n 
and through the i!legiti1nate'~ naniral father and hi~ kindred if: (a) The natural parenh 
participated in a n1arriage ceremony before the birth of the child. even though the marriage was 
subsequently declared null and void or dissolved by a court; or (b) There ha~ been an adjudication 
of paternity or legitimacy before the death of the intestate; or (e) J"herc has been an adJudicanon of 
paternity after the death of the intc~Late, based upon clear and convincing evidence, in an heirship 
proceeding under Sections 91-1-27 and 91-1-29.") 
l 74. Sec. e g., VA. CODE A"ll\1 § 64. 1-5.1.3 (2006) ('"[A] person horn out of \\'Cdlock is a child 
of the mother. That person is also a child of the father, if: a. The biological parents participated in a 
marriage ceremony before or after the birth of the child, even though the attempted 1narriagc was 
prohibited by la\v, deemed null or void or dissolved by a court; orb. The paternity is established by 
clear and convincing evidence, including sciennfically reliable genetic testing, a~ 'ct forth in 
§64.1-5.2 "');OR. REV. S!AT § 112.105(2)(b)(2005) ("'The father ~hall have acknowledged 
himself to be the father in wnting signed by him during the lifetime of the child.'); f-1 '<.STAT. Ai-.._,._ 
§ 732.108(2)(a)-(c) (\Ve't 2005) (listing ~!cps that have to be taken to make a non-marital child the 
"lineal descendent" of the child's father); Mr. RLv. SrAT. A1':-i. tit. 18-A, § 2-109(2)(iii) (1998) 
(pennitllng a non-marital child to inherit from the child'~ father if ·'[t]hc father acknov,.·lcdges in 
writing before a notary public that he is the father of the child .. "): LA. REV. SiAI AJ\'l\. 
§ 9:392(6) (1997) (''Once an acknowledi:,'Illent of paternity is signed. the child \\'Ill have inheritance 
rights and any rights afforded children born in wedlock."); 755 ILL. C0\1P. STAL ANC\. 512-2(h) 
(\Vest 1992) (providing that a non-marital child i' the heir of his or her father if there ha~ been an 
acknowledgment of paternity); J\.C. GE"I. STAT. § 29-19(h)(l)-(2) (2005) ("For purposes of 
inle~tate succe~sion, an illcgitunate child shall be entitled to take by, through and from: (l) Any 
person who has been finally adjudged to be the father of such child pursuant lo the provisions of 
G.S. 49-1 through 49-9 or the provisions of C:i.S. 49-14 through 49- l 6; (2) Any person \\'ho has 
acknov,-Jedged himself dunng his own lifct1me and the child's lifetime to be the father of such child 
in a \\'ritten instn1mcnt executed or ackno\\·lcdgcd before a certifying officer named in (J_S. 52­
lO(b) and filed during his O\\'ll lifeti1nc and the child's lifetime in the office of the clerk ofsupenor 
court of the county where either he or the child resides."). 
-- --------- ------------
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be established after the death of the father as long as it can be proven by '·clear 
and convincing cvidence.'' 175 These mandates make sense given the goal of the 
intestacy system. 176 For instance, it can be argued that if a man marries the 
mother of his non-marital child, he \.Vould want that child to inherit a portion of 
his cstatc. 177 Moreover, the paternity requirement enables the court to weed out 
fraudulent paternity claims. 1"he statutory conditions also protect the marital 
children by limiting the number of legally-recognized heirs. 
On the other hand, statutes that make the inheritance rights of non-marital 
children contingent upon marriage or paternity determination unfairly burden 
non-marital children. Non-marital children are penalized for inactions over 
which they have no control. 17 ~ For example, a non-marital child cannot force his 
175. See, eg., TE"IN. CODE Al'."N. § 3l-2-105(a)(2)(B) (2001) ('·(a) If, for purpo~es of intestate 
succession. a relationship of parent and child must be established to determine succession by, 
through, or from a pcr~un: ... (2) Jn cases not covered by ~ubdiv1sion (a)(l), a person born out of 
wedlock is a child of the 1nother. That person is al~o a child of the father. if: (B) The paternity is 
establi~hed by an adjudication before the death of the father or i~ establi~hed thereafter by clear and 
convincing proof .."); \10. A'.'."N. STAT.§ 474.060 2(1)-(2) (We~t 1992) ("That person is also a 
child of the father, 1f either of the follov:ing occur: (1) The natural parents participated in a 
marriage ceremony before or after the birth of the child, even though the attempted marnllge is 
void; (2) The paternity is establi~hed by an adjudication before the death of the father, or is 
established thereafter by clear and convincing proof .."): l\'r:B. R1'v S·1AT. !i 30-2309(2) (1995) 
(providing, in pertinent part, that a child born out of wedlock is "a child of the father, 1f: ... (ii) the 
paternity is c~tablished by an adjudication before the death of the father or is cstabhshed thereafter 
by ~trict, clear and convincing proof .... "); KY. !{EV. STAT A-..'N. § 39l.\05(l)(a)-(b) (LexisNcxis 
1999) ("That person ts abo a child of the natural father if: (a) The natural parents participated in a 
marriage ceremony before or a~cr the birth of the child, even though the atte1npted 1narriage is 
void, or (b) In detemiining the right of the child or it~ de~cendants to inherit from or through the 
father:\. There has been an adjudical!on ofpatemity before the death ufthe father; or 2 There has 
been an ad1ud1cation of paternity afier the death of the father based upon clear and convincing 
proof ");IDAHO CODE AN;>; § 15-2-109(b)(l)-(2) (2001) ("'That person 1s also a child of the 
father, if. ( 1) The natural parents participated in a marriage cercmuny before or llfter the birth of the 
child, even though the attempted rnarriage is void; or (2) The paternity is established by an 
adjudication before the death of the father or 1s established thereafter by clear and convincing proof 
"');ALA. Coo~§ 43-8-48(2)(a)"(b) (1991) ("That person is also a child of the father, if: a. The 
natural parents pan1c1patcd in a marriage ceremony before or after the birth of the child. even 
though the atle1npted marriage 1s void; or h. The paternity is c~1abli~hed by an adjudication before 
the death of the father or is established thereafter by clear and convincing proof .. "); ME. REV 
SIAI. Al\~. tit. 18-A § 2-109(2)(i)-(ll) (1998) ("that person is also a child of the father if: (i) The 
natural parents participated in a marrillge ceremony before or after the birth of the child, even 
though the attempted marriage is void; or (ii) fhc father adopt' the child into hi~ family; or (iii) The 
father acknovdcdges in wnting before a notary public that he i., the father of the child, or the 
paternity i., e~tabli.,hed by an adjudication before the death of the father or 1s cstabli,hed thereafter 
by clear and cunvincing proof ... ··). 
176. Andrew L. Noble, Intestate Succession for Stepchildren in l'enn.1ylvania A l'ropo~·a/ far 
RPfarm. 64 U. PITT. I.. REV. 835, 847 (2003) ("The primary purpose of intestacy statutes 1s to 
sati~fy the likely intent of the decedent."). 
177. See Richard L. Brown, DH inheriting the ''Legal Orphan··. Inheritance R1ghls of (,"hildren 
!.!fler l'ennination ofParl'ntal Rights, 7 Mo. L. REV. 125. 150-51 (2005) (rejecting this argument). 
178. Ralph C. Brashier. Consanguinity, Sihling Relationships, and the L)efau/t Rules of 
fnher//ance l.av.:: Reshapinr; lfalj-8/nod Statutes to Rejlec1 the F:vu/vinr; Fomily, 58 SML L. REv. 
137, 166-67 (2005). 
25 Fall 2007] CH!LDRE1V (JF MEN 
or her parents to participate 1n a marriage ceremony. In addition, a non-1narital 
child \vho is under the age of majority has no way of ensuring that a paternity 
action is filed. Non-marital children in low-income families and families of color 
may be especially disadvantaged by statutory requirements that focus upon the 
. 1· h . 179 A h . d hactions o t c1r parents. s t e next section emonstratcs, some states ave 
put in place complicated statutory schemes that require non-marital children to 
jump through several legal hoops to earn the right to inherit from their fathers. 
3. Birth Pius C'omplex Parental Action L'quals inheritance Rights 
·rhe Vermont probate statute permits a non-marital child to inherit from his or 
her father on equal terms with marital children as long as the father has "openly 
and notoriously claimed the child to be his own."180 If the father has not taken 
that action, the non-marital child can only inherit if a court has determined the 
father to be the "putative" 1H1 father of the child. 182 Another Jurisdiction that has 
an "open and notorious" requirement is Maryland. 183 lo\va puts a twist on its 
statutory requirement by nlandating that the father's recognition of the child be 
"general and notorious." 184 
Indiana has a "relation back" type of statutory scherne. If certain statutory 
requirements are satisfied, the non-marital child \viii be treated as 1f his or her 
parents had been married when the child was bom. 185 Thus, the child would not 
have been born out of wedlock and would inherit on equal terms with the 
decedent's marital children. 186 Indiana's two-tiered inheritance system for non­
-------··---- -------·--------- -- -­
179. See Foster, supra note 13. at 246 ("[F]or rnany African Ainencan, /\1ex1can Arncrican, and 
Native Amcncan comn1un1t1cs nonmantal cohab1tallon 1s both a cultural tradition and common 
practice." (citing Cynthia Grant HO\.\'man, A f"eminist Praposa/ ta Bring Back C'ommon Law 
lvtarriagf', 75 ()R. L. REV 709, 725-31. 767 ( 1996)))- ' 
180. \'T. STAI" A'\N. tit 14, § 553(b)(2) (2002). 
181 See W. VA. CODE Ar,·"-§ 48-23-209 (Lexisl\"exis 2004) (""Putative fi1ther' means any 1nan 
not dec1ned or adjudicated under thi; laws of a Jurisdiction of the United Stales to be the t;11her of 
genetic origin of a child and •vlu1 claims or is alleged to be the 1;11hcr of genetic ongin of such 
child_ ..). 
182 VT.STAT.A>.;N.tit 14,§553(b)(i)-(2)(2002). 
183. MD. COil!· A"N., Es·i & TRUSTS§ l-208(b)(l)-(4) (l.ex1sNexis 2001) ('·A child born to 
parents who have not participated in a marnage ceremony \Vith each other shall be considered to be 
the child of his father only if the fathi;r: ( 1) Has been Judicially detennined to be the father in an 
acl!on brought under the statute~ relating 10 paternity proceedings; (2) I !as ackno\vledged himself, 
in writing, to be the father; (3) Has openly and notoriously recognit:ed the child to be hi~ child; or 
(4) Has subsequently married the mother and has acknowledged himself: orally or in \\'riling, to be 
the father.'·) (emphasis added). 
184. JO\\·,\ CODI-' AN'\ § 633.222 (West 1992) ("L:nless the child has been adopted, a biological 
child inherits fro111 the child·s biological !tither if the evidence proving paternity i~ available during 
the father'~ lifetime, or 1f the child ha~ been recognized by the father as his child; but the 
recognlfion must hav(' br1en f:enf'raf and notor1ou~. or 111 writing:') (emphasis added). 
185 l"D. ConEA"IN § 29-l-2-7(b) (\Vest 1999). 
186. Id.§ 29-l-2-7(d). 
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marital children assigns rights by age of the child. 187 Like other states, in order 
for the non-marital child to inherit from the child's father, a successful paternity 
action must be brought on his or her bchalf. 188 However, Indiana's approach is 
unique because the time at which the paternity action must be filed depends upon 
the age of the non-marital children. 1"he statute further gives younger non­
marital children additional time to establish patemity. 189 
The Georgia probate statute is written in the negative. It states as a rule that 
the non-marital child normally docs not have a right to inherit from his or her 
father. 'rhcn, it lists exceptions to the rule that would permit the non-marital 
child to inherit. 190 When drafting the statute, the Georgia Legislature appeared to 
be concerned about the possibility of false claims being made against the estate 
of a dead man. 191 As a result, the non-marital child must under?o genetic testing 
in order to be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of paternity. 19 The statute also 
lessens the likelihood that a man's estate will be inherited by someone who is not 
his true heir. In order for a non-marital child to have the right to inherit from his 
or her father, a court must legitimize the child1 q_i or establish the father's 
patemity. 194 If neither of these incidents has occurred, the child still has the 
possibility of inheriting from his or her father as long as the father he has taken 
actions indicating that he believed the child to be his. 195 After the non-marital 
child meets any of the statutory mandates, he or she has the right to inherit from 
his or her father in the same manner as marital children. 196 
187. Compure id.§ 29-l-2-7(b)(I) (outlining requirements for children over 20 years of age), 
with§ 29-l-2-7(h)(2) (outlining requirements for children under 20 years of age). 
188 Id. §29-l-2-7(b). 
189 Id. § 29-1-2-7(b )( 1 )-(2)(8) ("( 1) The paternity of a child \Vho wa<; at least twenty (20) years 
uf age when the father died has heen estabh~hed by law in a cause of actiun that is filed during the 
father's lifetime. (2) The paternity of a child vvho was less than twenty (20) years of age v.·hen the 
father died has been established by lav.· in a cause of acuon that is filed: (A) during the father's 
lifetime; or (R) within five (5) months after the father's dcath.")­
190. CJA. CODE ANT\ § 53-2-3(2)(A) (\Vest 2006) (''A child horn out of\vcdlock may not inherit 
from or through the child's father, the other child of the father, or any paternal kin by reason of the 
parental kinship, unless ... "). 
191. Id_§ 53-2-3(2)(A)(v) (''fhcre is clear and convincing evidence that the child is the child of 
the !lither."). 
192_ Id. § 53-2-3(2)(B)(ii) (''There shall exist a rcbuttable presumption of paternity of a child 
horn out of ·wedlock if paren1age-determin11tion genetic !c~ting e~tablishes at least a 97 percent 
probability of paternity. Parentage-determination genetlc testing shall include, but not be limllcd 
to. red cell antigen, human leucocyte antigen (HLA), red cell enzy1ne, and senim protein 
clcctrophorcs1s tests or tesnng by deoxynbonuclcic acid (ON.>\) probes."). 
193 Id. § 53-2-3(2)(A)(i) ("A court of competent jurisdiction has entered an order declaring the 
child to be legitimate, under the authority of Code Section !9-7-22 or ~ueh other authority as may 
be provided by law ..."). 
194. Id. § 53,2-3(2)(A)(1i) ("A cuun of competent _junsd1ction has otherwise entered a court 
order establishing paternity "). 
195_ Id. § 53-2-3(2)(A)(iii) ("The father has executed a sworn statement signed by him attesting 
to the parent-child rela\\onship __ "). See also 1d. § 53-2-3(2)(A)(iv) ("The father has signed the 
birth certificate of the child ....") 
196. Id § 53-2-3(2)(c). 
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The New York statute is a legitimizing statute. In order for a non-marital child 
to inherit from his or her father, the non-marital child must be legitimizcd. 197 The 
statute sets out specific actions that the parents of the non-marital child must take 
in order for the child to be considered legitimate. Legitimization is necessary for 
the child to have a right to inherit from his or her father. New York gives the 
non-marital child more opportunities to inherit from his or her father than most 
jurisdictions. ·rhe statute gives the non-marital child a broad list of options when 
it comes to earning the right to inherit from his or her father. 198 Hence, a non­
marital child has a better chance of inheriting from his or her father in New York 
than in other states. Nonetheless, the non-marital child does not have unlimited 
access to the probate court and may be denied the right to inherit. for instance, 
under the terms of the statute, a non-marital child can receive child support from 
his or her tathcr during the father's lifetime, and still not have the right to inherit 
from his or her father. 199 Moreover, the statute gives the non-marital child's 
father the opportunity to challenge the non-marital child's right to inherit.200 
4. Time Restraints 
;\ key argument tOr putting restrictions on the inheritance rights of non-marital 
children is the need to bring finality to the probate grocess. 201 Probating an estate 
can be a time-consuming and expensive venture.2 Thus, states are reluctant to 
set up statutory systems that pennit non-marital children unrestricted access to 
the probate court. 
197. \'.Y. EST.l'O\VFRS & TRL'STS LAW§ 4-1.2(2) (McKinney 1998) ("A non-rnarital child !S the 
legitimate child of his father so that he and his i~suc inherit from his father and his paternal kindred 
if' certain incidents take place.). 
198. Id. ("A non-marital child is the Jegillmatc child of his father so that he and hi~ issue inherit 
fro1n his father and his paternal kindred if: (A) a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the 
lifetime of the fath<er, made an order of filiation declaring paternity or the mother and the father of 
the child have executed an acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to section four thousand one 
hundred thirty-!ivc-b of the public health law, which has been filed with the registrar of the distnct 
in which the birth certificate has been filed or; (B) the father of the child has signed an instrurnent 
ack110\vlcdging paternity (C) paternity ha~ been established by clear and convincing evidence 
and the father of the child has openly and notoriously acknowledged the child as his own; or (D) a 
blood genetic marker test had hccn adn1inistcred to the father i,vhich together \'itlh other evidence 
estahhshes paternity by clear and convincing evidence."). 
199 Id.§ 4-1.2(3) ("The existence of an agreement obligating the father to support the non­
marital child docs not qualify such child or hi-; issue to inhent from the father in the absence of an 
order of filiation made or ackno,,.,.·lcdgmcnl of paternity as prescribed by subparagraph (2)."). 
200 Id. § 4-1.2(4) ("A motion for relief fro1n an order of filiation rnay be made only by Lhc 
father and a motion for relief fron1 an acknowledgment of paternity may be mudc by the father, 
mother or other legal guardian of such child, or the child, provided however, such motion must be 
made within one year from the entry of such order or from the date of written notice as provided fbr 
in subparagraph(2).") 
201 See Recd v. Campbell, 476 lJ.S 852, 855-56 (1986). 
202. Martin L. Camp & Maria Luisa Canovas, AdvisinR ForeiRn Investment in U.S Reul £~·tale, 
nr Ilu"' 10 be r; Modern Renaissanr.eAl/orney, 3 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 22, 34 (1997). 
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In order to bring closure to the probate process, most states have restricted the 
time in which a non-1narital child can file a claim against an cstatc. 20-' l"hc 
. f .<lea one-year statute o r1··. 204 Thosc statutes havemaJonty o states prov1 1m1tat1ons. 
been deemed to be unconstitutional. In dealing \vith paternity actions brought for 
c_hil_d suppo~ puTIJ1oses, the Supreme Court has not been as deferential to state 
t1m1ng restraints. 5
Some states have placed additional time restrictions on the inheritance rights 
of non-marital children. For example, under the South Carolina statute, if the 
parents do not marry, the non-tnarital child must establish paternity within a 
certain time period in order to have the right to inherit. 206 ·rhis type of time 
restraint may present an insurmountable impediment to a non-marital child who 
is under the age of majority or is disabled when the father dies. States have 
therefore sought to lessen this hardship by tolling the running of the time 
203. See, e.g, 01!10 Rl:V. CODE ANN § 3111.05 (\Vest 2005) ("An action to dctcrrnine the 
existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship may not be brought later than five 
years after the child reaches the age of eighteen.''); ARK. CouE AN'\. ~ 28-9-209(t) (2004) 
("Kothing contained in this section shall extend the ti1nc •within which a right of inheritance or a 
nght to a succession may be asserted beyond the time provided by la\\' relating to d1stribu11on and 
closing of decedents' estates or to the dctcnn1nation ofhcirship, or otherwise."). 
204. See, e.g., LA. Rl-.V STA"I AN!\.§ 13:3721 (1997) 
205. \1ills v. Habluet,:el, 456 U.S. 91, 97-103 (1981) (striking do\\'n a Texas statute that 
required patcnuty action to be filed by the time the child was one-year old because it only gave the 
non-mantul child un illusory chance of receiving child support from the father). 
206 See. e.g., S.C. CODE AK:'-!. § 62-2-109(2)(ii) (1987 & Supp. 2006) ("'[T]he patemlty is 
established by an adjudication commenced before the death of tht:: father or within the later of eight 
months after the death of the father or six month~ after the initial appointment of a per~onal 
reprcsentanvc of his estate. and if afier hi~ death, by clear and convincing proof "'), W. VA. 
COllfo ANN § 42-l-5(c)(l)-(2) (Lcx1sNcxis 2004) ("After the death of the father, paternity shall be 
established if, after a hearing on the merits, the court shall find. by clear and convincing evidence, 
that the rnan i~ the father of the child. The civil action shall be filed in the fatnily court of the 
county where the administration of the decedent's estate ha~ been filed or could be filed: ( 1) Within 
six months of the date of the final order of the county com1nission admitting the decedent·~ will Lo 
probate or commencing intestate administration of the estate; or (2) If none of the above apply, 
within ~ix n1onths from the date of dci.:edent's death.''), Miss. CODE ANT\ § 91-l-15(3)(c) (2004) 
("However, no such claim of inheritance shall be recognized unle~s !he action seeking adjudication 
of paternity is filed \\'ithin one (1) year after the death of the intestate or within ninety (90) days 
after the first publication of nonce to creditors to present their claims, \vhichcvcr is less ... "); N.C. 
G1·.N. S1Al S 29-19(b)(2) (2005) ("l\otwithstanding the above provisions, no person shall be 
entitled to take hereunder unless be ha' given 1Nritten notice of the basis of hi~ claim to the personal 
reprcscntanve of the putative father v•ithtn six months after the date of the first pubhcalion or 
posting ofthe general notice to creditors."). 
---------
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period207 or by permitting a legal representative to file an action on behalf of the 
child. 20s 
RccogniLing the need fOr uniti:irmity in probate matters, scholars and 
practitioners collaborated to draft the Uniform Probate Code ("UPC") and the 
Uniform Parentage Act ("lJPA"). 209 The next section examines the approach the 
uniform acts take with regard to the inheritance rights of non-marital children. 
c:. UniJOrm Ap/Jroach 
Under both the UPC210 and the UPA,2 11 children have the ri.flht to inherit from 
their fathers regardless of the marital status of their parents. 2 This approach 
attempts to make non-marital children equal to marital children for inheritance 
purposes. Hence, non-marital children arc not punished because of the actions 
taken by their parents. 213 States that have adopted this approach have enacted 
their o\vn versions of the UPA. 214 
207 See. e g., V.1 VA. CODE A~N § 42-l-5(d) (LexisNexis 2004) ("Any putative child \Vho at 
the tirne of the decedent's death is under the age of eighteen years, a eonvicl or a mentally 
incapael!ated person may file such civil acllon within <;ix months after he or she become~ of age or 
the disability cea;,c~ "'). Rut see Mis~. CODE ANN § 91-l-15(3)(c) (2004) (providing "such period 
shall run notv.'ithstanding the rninority of the child"); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1(4) (2006) 
('"Hov.·ever, ~uch one-year period shall run notv>ithstanding the minnnty of such child."'). 
208. See, e.g., VA. Coo10 A~N. § 64.1-5.1(4) (2006) (permitting a person acting on behalf of the 
nun-marital child to file an affidavit ~upporting paternity). 
209. Stephanie J. \Villbanks, Purling Is Such Sweet Sorrow, but Dues It !lave tu Be So 
Complicated? Transm1ss1on nj'Property al Death in Vcnnont, 29 VI L Rrv. 895, 900-04 (2005) 
(discu<;s1ng the purpose and history of the Unifonn Probate Code). See also CJ!ga \/ 
Kotlyarevskaya & Sara H. Poster, Separation Anxiety Among Caf1/or11ia Courts Addressing the 
C:anjus1011 over Same-Sex f'ortners" Parentage C:la1ms, I 0 U .C. DAVlS J. J11v. !... & Po1.'y 153, 157­
58 (2006) (discussing the history of the Unifonn Parentage Act). 
210 U~IF. PRORATE Con~. § 2-1 14 (2006), available at http://www.la•N.upenn.edu/b\l/arehives/ 
ulc/upc/final2005.ht1n (last visited July l 8, 2007) ("[F]or purpose~ of intestate <;ucec<;sion by, 
through, or from a person, an individual is the child of his for her] natural parents, regardless of 
their marital status."). 
211. UN!F. PAR!"'\ I AGE ACT § 202 (2002), ava1lahle at http"//wiw·w. law.upcnn.cdu/bll/archivesl 
ulclupa/fina12002.htni (la~t visited July I 8, 2007) ("A child born to parents who are nol rnarried to 
each other has the sarne rights under the law as a child born to parents who arc married to each 
other."). 
212 Id. 
213. This is consistent with the reasoning of several LS. Supreme Court cases. For cxan1ple, in 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety C:n., the Court ~lated: 
The status of illegitimacy ha~ expressed through the ages ~ocicty's condc1nna1ion of 
irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. Rut visiting this condemnation on the 
head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate 
child is contrary to the ba~ic concept of our ~y~tcm that legal burdens should bear ~omc 
rdationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child 1s re~pon~ible for 
his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child i<; an ineffectual- -as V>.'Cll as an unjust-v.'ay of 
dctcmng the parent. 
406U.S.164, 175(1971). 
214. A discu;,siun of state statutes is included in the previous section. 
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The legal obligations and rights that parents and children have with regard to 
one another depend upon a legal recognition of a parent-child rclationship.215 
Thus, in order for a child to inherit from a parent, that relationship must be 
established. The UPA \Vas designed to ensure that the establishment of the 
parent-child relationship was not dependent upon the child's birth status.216 
Under the UPA's approach, the relationship bct\veen the parents and their 
children exists regardless of the nature of the parents' relationship. If that 
relationship 1s disputed, the non-marital child has the right to prove the existence 
. h" 217f th I 1p.o e re attons 
Under the scheme set forth by the UPA, when the father and mother do not 
marry or attempt to marry, the law presumes the existence of a father-child 
relationship between the father and child if one of the following conditions 
exists: (I) before the child reaches the age of two, the father and child live in the 
same household and the father openly holds the child out as his natural child; or 
(2) the father files a written acknowledgment of paternity with an appropriate 
court or administrative agency.218 If the presumption is not rebutted, the child 
has a right to inherit equivalent to that of marital children. If neither one of the 
stated requirements is met, the non-marital child has the burden of proving a 
claim of paternity in order to be able to inherit from his or her father. 219 
·rhis uniform approach tries to remove the stigma and hardship of illegitimacy 
in accordance with today's public policy. More and more people are choosing to 
have children without the benefit ofmarriage.22° Furthermore, a segment of the 
population is not permitted to marry because of their sexual orientation.221 Thus, 
---- ·---------­
215. See. e.g., NEV. REV. SrAT. § 126.021.3 (2005) ('"Parent and child relationship' means the 
legal relationship bch.,·een a child and his natural or adoptive parenb incident to vihich the law 
confer~ or impo~es nghts, privileges, dunes and obligations. It includes the mother and child 
relation~hip and the father and child relationship."). 
216. Kotlyarevskaya & Poster, supra note 209, at 158. 
217. Sf'e lJNif. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 201-204 (2002), avaifahle at http://wv:w.lav.• upenn.cdu/bll/ 
archivcslulc/upalfina!2002.htm (last visited July 18, 2007). 
218. ld. § 204(a)(5). 
219. \Jnder § 20l(b): 
The fi1ther-child relationship is established between a man and a child by: (1) an unrebutted 
presumption of the man's paternity of the child under Section 204; (2) an cffccnve 
acknow·lcdgrnent of paternity by the man under [Article] 3, unles~ the acknowledgemenl has 
been rescinded or successfully challenged; (3) an adjudication of the man's paternity; 
(4) adoption of the child by the man; [or] (5) the man's having consented to assisted 
reproduction by a his wife under [Article] 7 \Vh1ch resulted in the birth of the child; or (6) an 
adjudication confinning the man as a parent of a child born to a gestational mother if the 
agreement was validated under [Article] 8 or is enforceable under other !av..' 
Id.§ 20l(b). 
220. Louis W. Sullivan, The Doctor's RXfiir America's Troubled Children ... Strengthening the 
American f'ami!y, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. Po1:Y 5, 6 (1992). 
221 See Laura M. Rai~ty, Bystander !Jistress and Lo.is o_((:onsortium. An Examination oj the 
Relationship Requirements 1n light of Romer v. Evans, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2647, 2676-77 
(1997). See also Jennifer Seidman, r·unc//onul Families and 1Jy.1functional laws: Commilled 
l'artners and Intestate Succession, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 211, 218 (2004). 
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the children of those relationships arc non-marital. 222 No child should be held 
responsible for the circumstances of his or her birth. Therefore, it makes sense to 
have an inheritance system that gives all children the equal opportunity to inherit 
from their mothers and their fathcrs. 223 
The UPA provides equal opportunity, but not true equality for the non-marital 
child. The marital child does not have to take any action for the presumption of a 
parent-child relationship to arise. To the contrary, for the non-marital child, the 
presumption of paternity arises only if his or her father takes some type of 
affirmative action. Under the UPA, the non-marital child is still penalized fOr the 
actions or inactions of his or her parents. It is impossible for a child that is less 
than two years old to take steps to live in the same hou:.ehold as his or her father 
or to force his or her father to file a written acknowledgment. ·rhe non-marital 
child suffers the consequences for his or her tilthcr's inaction. 
·rhc UPA 's treatment of non-marital children could be justified by relying on 
contract principles. The marital contract implies an agreement on the part of the 
man to provide for children born of the marriage.224 Hence, the UPA's 
presumption is just a recognition of that promise and does not place any new 
duties on the father. In a non-marital situation, the agreement to support a child 
that is the product of the relationship cannot be implied. Consequently, the 
agreement has to be expressed in some fashion. Under the UPA, the expression 
has to take the form of one of the listed conditions. If a man engages in any one 
of the behaviors listed, he indicates his willingness to be responsible for the 
child. Thus, it 1s reasonable fur the law to presume that he \Vants the non-marital 
child to be one of his heirs. 
Currently, the UPA 's approach has not been adopted by a majority of the 
states. Most states require some type of action before the non-marital child is 
permitted to be an heir of the child's father. l"he current state intestate system is 
confusing and does not reflect the actual intent of the dccedent. 225 In addition, 
this approach is flawed because it requires non-marital children and their parents 
to know and understand complicated rules. The next section will explain the 
actions that states should take to improve the current intestacy system through 
improved balance and increased flexibility. 
222. Debra Carra~qu11lo Hedges, The 1-"orgoflen Children ..1:ame-Sex Partners. Their Children 
and (_inequa! Treatment, 41 n.C. L. Rr.v. 883, 903 (2000) ("Children born tu hotnosexual parents 
arc analogous to children bum out of wedlock."). Since same ~ex couples arc permitted to marry in 
Ma~sachusett~, the children of those unions would probably be considered marital for inheritance 
purposes in that state. See Goodridge v. Dcp't Df Pub. Health. 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (.\itass. 2003). 
223. The Uniform Parentage Act was enacted to do away with the differential treatment suffered 
by non-marital children and to provide a un1form system to govern paternity dispute~. See LiKif. 
PAREC\'TAGE ACT Prefatory Note (2002), avai!ah!e at http://v.·ww.la\.\'.upenn.edu/bll/::irehives/ 
ulc/upalfina12D02 htm (last visited July 18, 2007). 
224 Sho~hana L. Gillcrs, Note, A labur Theory o.f ler;a! f'arenthood, l l 0 YALE L.J. 691, 711­
12 (2001). 
225. Gary, supra note 170, at 65 I ("The primary goal of intestacy laws is to carry out the 
decedent's presumed intent."). 
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IV. A BErfER APPROACH F<)R ALL PARTIES CONCER""lED 
In many instances, non-manta] children arc unfairly treated by state intestate 
succession statutory schemes. As previously discussed, state intestacy statutes 
disadvantage non-marital children because they make the right to inherit too 
dependent on parental actions prior to and after the birth. For example, in most 
jurisdictions, a non-marital child cannot inherit unless paternity has been 
established. Generally, the individual who files the paternity action ts the mother 
of the non-marital child. l"hus, the non-marital child's right to inherit is often 
dependent upon his or her mother's action. The mother's inaction may prove 
detrimental to the child. 226 A state intestacy system based upon unifonnity and 
t3.imess \vould promote three fundamental interests: (1) the state's interest in 
protecting the integrity of the probate system; (2) the non-marital child's interest 
in protecting the right to be treated equally under the probate system; and (3) the 
marital child's interest in protecting the expectancy of inheritance under the 
probate system. 
A. fm1Jroving the Current System 
1. Recognizing the iVeedjiir Information 
In order to make infOnned decisions, parents of non-marital children should 
knov.' all of the facts and rules. State intestacy lav.·s can be confusing. For 
instance, many low-income women may believe that if the father's name 1s on 
the birth certificate, the non-marital child has the right to inherit from his or her 
father. As a result, such \Vomen do not bother to tile paternity actions as required 
by most state statutes. In reality, only two states deem the father's name on the 
birth certificate as sufficient proof of paternity to permit a non-marital child to 
inherit from his or her father. 227 In both states, the father's name cannot be 
placed on the birth certificate without his knowledge and consent. 
Women who live in common la\V marriage jurisdictions228 arc also 
disadvantaged by lack of access to information. Many women living in those 
states believe that if they live with a man for a long period of time, they are 
----- ----- ----· - -- --· - ·--·--·---- --­
226. See Mill~ v. llabluetzel, 456 U.S 91, 100 (1981) (recogni..:ing the reasons \vhy the mother 
of a non-marital child might not bring a paternity action, "[f]1nanc1al difficulties caused by child 
birth expenses or a b1rth-relatcd loss of income, continuing affi:ct1on for the child's father, a desire 
10 avoid d1sapproval of family and community, or the en101ional ~\rain and confusion that often 
attend the birth of an lllegitimal~ child all encumber a mother's filing of a paternity suit wllhin 12 
months of birth"). 
227. ln both states, the father's narnc cannot be placed on the birth certificate \V1thout his 
knov,;lcdgc 11nd consent. ARK. CODE A'IN. § 28-9-209(d)(3) (2004) ("The man'~ name appears with 
his wrillen consent on the birth certificate as the father of the child ... :')(emphasis added); GA. 
CODE A~N. S 53-2-3(2)(A)(iv) (\Vest 2006) ("'The father has signed the birth certificate of the 
child:'). 
228. Sonya C. Gar..:a, Commun Lai~ ,\1arriage. A f'ropusalfar the Revh;af ofa Dying Doctrine, 
40 Nl''W E:"U. L. REV. 541, 541 (2006) ("[O]n!y eleven states and the District of Columbia 
recogni..:c common law marriage "). 
------ ---- -
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automatically deetned to be married. ·rhose women do noF realize that, if they do 
not take the steps necessary to have their relationships legally recognized as 
common la\v marriages,229 their children are considered non-marital children. 
Consequently, the women do not take the actions necessary to ensure that their 
children will have the legal right to inherit from their fathers. 
Non-marital children often lose the right to inherit from his or her father 
because of the ignorance of his or her parents. In the probate arena. kno\vledge is 
power; therefore, states should take steps to make sure that parents understand 
the steps they need to take in order to enable non-marital children to inherit from 
their fathers. ·rherc arc actions states can take to get the necessary information to 
the public. For instance, states could run public service announcements on local 
television and radio stations. Public Service Announcements could inform 
women about the legal consequences of having a child out of \vcdlock and 
educate parents about the steps they 1nust take under the state's intestacy statute 
to make the non-marital child eligible to inherit from his or her father. States 
could also require organization!> that provide services to low-income women to 
distribute pamphlets containing infOnnation about the state's intestacy la\VS. The 
pamphlets could include a checklist of the requirements fOr a non-marital child to 
earn the right to inherit from his or her father. In order to guarantee fairness. 
states should arm parents of non-marital children with the information necessary 
to protect the inheritance rights of those children. 
2. Recognizing the NeedfOr UnijiJrmity 
Traditionally, the inheritance process has been the domain of the state. 230 ·rhc 
fact that courts recognize a probate exception indicates that states arc considered 
1the primary arbiters of probate matters. 2,; Nonetheless, uniformity is needed 
when it comes to the treatment of non-marital children for inheritance purposes. 
A homogeneous approach, like the one suggested by the UPA, would bring 
stability and consistency to the probate process. 232 States have historically 
adopted such unitOrm approaches when a situation dictates action. For example, 
a majority of the states adopted the lJPC and tailored it to fit their unique needs. 
States could take the same approach when dealing with inheritance rights of non­
marital children by adopting the UPA and modifying it as needed to be 
compatible with their overall intestacy statutory scheme. 
229. See Ani:la R. Dubler, W!fely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting .Married, 100 Co1.U~l. L. 
REV. 957, 970·71 (2000) (noting that some court~ wi!I place a rebuttable presutnption on the 
lcgitlmacy of children in a comrnon law marriage). 
230. See Kenerally Peter Chase, Note, The /Jniform International Will: The iv·ext Step in the 
1:,"volution ofTestamentory [)]~position. 6 n U. INT'L 1..1. 317, 329-30 ( 1988). 
231 Christian 1. (Jrosiic, Note, A Prudential F:xercise. Ab.1tentiun and the f'rohate E\ccption to 
f·cderul Diver<:ay .!urhdiction, 104 .\11CH. L. REV 131, 132 (2005) ('·At its core, the probate 
exception stand~ for the proposition that federal courts do not have the authority to probate wills or 
adn11n1ster estates.'"). 
232. SeP Vegter, supra note 20, at 302-03 ("Uniform acts are drafted 'to promote uniforrnity . 
where uniformity is dc~1r.Jblc and practicable, by voluntary action of each state government.""'). 
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l'hc fact that people arc more mobile suggests the need for standardization. 
Some states place restrictions on the recognition of paternity orders from other 
states \vhcn satisfying intestate statutory requiremcnts. 2 -1 3 As a result, a non­
marital child that adhered to the laws of his or her birth state may nevertheless be 
ineligible to inherit all or part of his or her father's estate. To illustrate, consider 
the following situation. A man has a non-marital child in State A and that child 
has satisfied the requirements to inherit from him in State A. 1"he man moves to 
State 8 and dies intestate in State R. The statutory requirements for a non­
marital child to inherit in State B arc different from those in State A. Further, 
State 8 does not recognize the paternity order from State A. Consequently, 
although the non-marital child complied with the statutory mandates of State A, 
he or she is unable to inherit from his or her father in State B. ·rhis outcome is 
unfair because the non-marital child has expectations of inheriting under the 
requirements of State A. 
Another reason why a uniform system is appropriate is that more than one 
state la\v can govern the distribution of a decedent's propcrty. 214 It is unjust to 
require a non-marital child to know and abide by the intestacy laws of more than 
one state. In the majority of jurisdic1ions, the non-marital child has a small 
window of opportunity to cstabli~h the father-child relationship for inheritance 
purposes. 235 Hence, the process to meet the requirements should be as simple as 
possible. 
B. Changing the Current System 
l. l'roviding Flexibility 
The pumose of the intestacy system is to carry out the presumed intent of the 
decedent.2 6 The current system is too inflexible to achieve that goal. As the 
definition of family evolves, the intestacy system needs to expand. ]"hus, there 
should not be a set of rigid rules that attempts to apply to all situations. This 
"one size fits all" approach to distributing the assets of a man who dies intestate 
is obsolctc. 737 ·rhc intestacy system should be flexible enough to take into 
consideration factors such as the siLc of the decedent's estate, the ages of the 
233 S<'e. e.g., Mrss. ConE A'.'IN. S91-1 15(3)(c)(i)-(1v) (2004). 
234 See Mark Evans 1 lardcn & Barbara A. Lindsey-Smith, Con1ment, Beivarf', Migruting 
Spouses. Texus I.arks a Quasi-(.'nmmunity Property Prohute Stature. It ('ould Be a Lung Winter, 3 
Tex. \VESLEYAN L. R1ov. 91, 105 (1996) ("'\Vhen a person dies, the laws of the state where the 
decedent lived at the time of his death determine the d1spusition of his per~onal property and his 
real property located in that slate.") See alsu Susan Lono,vski, Note, Descent and Di.1·trih11tiun, 33 
U. LOU!~V!LLE J. fA\.1. l. 768. 771 (1995) ("lTJhe la\v of the ~late in which land is situated governs 
the tran~fer of that land by will or intestacy.''). 
235. Ed \Vall is, An Outdated form ofEvidentiary Law: A Survey of /Jead .Mun 's Statutes and a 
Proposal for Change, 53 CI EV. ST. l. REV. 75, 86 (2005-2006) 
236 Gary, supra note 170, at 651-52. 
237. Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to (.'hanging r-amihes, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 3-5 
(2000). 
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decedent's children, and the relationship the decedent had with his children. 238 
The system I propose gives the probate court the flexibility to review all of the 
circumstances prior to determining how to divide a decedent's estate. 
2. Providing Balance 
When creating an intestacy system, the state legislature should attempt to 
balance and harmonize the interests of the state, the non-marital child, and the 
marital child in order to produce a fair and equitable result. 'rhc intestacy 
distribution scheme that I recommend provides that balance. 
The state has two legitimate interests with regard to the inheritance rights of an 
intestate decedent's children. First, the state seeks to protect the integrity of the 
probate system by limiting the number of fraudulent claims that might be filed 
against a decedent's estate. 239 My proposal addresses this concern by requiring 
non-marital children to prove paternity in order to gain the right to inherit from 
their fathers. Second, the state wants to provide financial support for minor and 
disabled children. Jn all jurisdictions, a man is legally obligated to support his 
minor and disabled children. That obligation should not end with his death.240 
My proposal promotes this state interest by permitting the probate court to 
consider the ages of the decedent's children and requiring the court to give 
preference to minor and disabled children. 
'rhc non-marital child's primary interest is to have an equal opportunity to 
inherit from his or her father. My proposal advances this interest by casing the 
burden placed upon non-marital children under the current intestacy system. 
This task is accomplished by allowing the probate court to accept evidence of 
paternity other than judicial adjudication or paternal acknowledgment by the 
father. Acceptable fonns of proof would include, but are not be limited to, 
evidence that the t8.ther's name is on the child's birth certificate; the father made 
child support payments during his lifetime; the father had an intimate relationship 
with the child's mother and verbally acknowledged the child as his child; or the 
f8.ther took the child into his household and held the child out as his child. 
Marital children arc interested in protecting their inheritance rights in their 
father's estate from being reduced. My proposal protects the interests ofrnarital 
children by making the inheritance rights of non-marital children subject to or 
dependent upon the inheritance rights of marital children. The current systcn1 
238. Id. at 71-73 (proposing a more flexible intestacy regirne). 
239. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268-69 ( 1978). 
240. Mark I .. Ascher, C'urtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. Rrv. 69, 141 (1990). ln making 
this argument, I join the numerous scholars that contend that a parent should not he able to 
disinherit a minor or disahlcd child. See. e f;., Deborah A. Batts, I Didn "1 Ask to Bf' Barn The 
American Law ofDisinheritance and a Proposal for C'hange lo a Sys tern of!'rotected Inheritance, 
41 HAS rI'\(;S L.J. 1197, 1202 (I 990); Rrian C. Arennan, Disinhf'ritance of' Dependent Chi/drl:'n 
Why Isn't America f"u/filhns; Its ./Waral (Jhlip;ation?, 14 QL"T'.'l'."IPJ>\C PROH. L.J. 125, 126 (1999); 
Ronald Chester, Should American Children Be Protected Again.1·1 Dis1nheritance?, 32 REAL l'ROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 405, 406 (1997) In addition, l embrace Louisiana's approach of protecting young 
children from being di~inhented. Ralph C. Arashicr. Protectinf; the Child ff-urn Disinheritance: 
Must Louisiana Stand Alone?, 57 LA. L REV. I, 1 (1996). 
36 UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
gives preference to marital children by ignoring them. Marital children only 
have to be born to have the right to inherit. Whereas, in most states, non-marital 
children have to jump through legal hoops 10 order to gain the right to inherit 
from their fathers. Furthennore, a man was historically presumed to have the 
obligation to provide financial su.fiport for children born during the marriage even 
if his paternity was in doubt.2 1 My proposal benefits marital children by 
including them in the equation and considering their interests when deciding 
\vhcther to give inheritance rights to non-marital children. 
3. Providing t:quity 
My system seeks to be fair to both marital and non-marital children; however, 
marital children arc given a slight edge. 1'hc advantage is justified because 
marital children and non-marital children have different legal statuses and roles 
in society. Strict equality cannot be expected or guaranteed when the law 
addresses two distinct classes of persons. Indeed, the Supreme Court allows 
states to place limitations on a non-marital child's right to inherit from his or her 
father. 242 Moreover, marital children have an expectancy of inheriting from their 
fathers. 243 That expectancy should not be thawed by the appearance of a 
previously unidentified non-marital child after the f8.thcr's death. An additional 
reason to give preference to the marital child is that the marital child is a third 
party beneticiary244 of the marital contract behveen the marital child's parents. 
My proposal also gives preference to ininor and disabled children. This is 
equitable because those children arc more financially dependent on their fathers 
than adult children. Adult children have the lifetime financial support of their 
fathers and the ability to encourage him to provide for them in his will.245 If 
minor or disabled children arc not taken care of by their fathers, the state usually 
assumes those obligations. In contrast, adult children arc expected to support 
themselves. 
241 Jana Singer, Marriage, Biulugy, and Paternity. The C'ase fur Revitalizing the Mari/a/ 
Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246. 248 (2006). 
242. Bro\\'ll, s11pru note 177, at 160-62. 

243 This expectancy is u~ually not considered a legal interest unless the child \\·as narned as an 

heir in a prior will. See Ja1ncs A. Fas~old, Tortiuus Interference \Vith Hxpectan1..y of Inheritunce . 
. New Tori, .New Traps, http:l/w\\W.grayfassold.com/articlcs!cxpeetancy.htm (last visited June 3, 
2007). 
244. See \1elv1n Aaron Ei,enbcrg, Third Party Beneficiaries, 92 Col lJ'\1. L. REV. 1358, 1373-78 
(1992). 
245. Brennan, su.pru note 240, at 139 ("Minor children are in a very precarious position because 
they. unlike adult fainlly members, do not have the political po\\•er to en~ure their protection from 
disinheritance). See also Chester, supra note 240, at 433-34 (arguing that all children should be 
prolectcd from disinhentanee). 
------- ---- ---
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4. Proposing Reform 
i. }./on-marital minor or disabled child vs. marital minor or disabled child 
If a married decedent is survived by his spouse, a non-marital minor or 
disabled child, and a marital minor or disabled child, the non-marital minor or 
disabled child should take the greater share of the decedent's estate. This is f<1ir 
because the surviving spouse and mother of the marital minor or disabled child is 
entitled to an elective share246 of the decedent's estate, while the mother of the 
non-marital minor or disabled child would not receive any additional resources to 
support that child. 
If the decedent is divorced or widowed at the time of his death and is survived 
by a non-marital minor or disabled child and a marital minor or disabled child, 
and his estate is under a certain dollar amount, the marital minor or disabled child 
takes the larger share of the estate. If the estate is below an established minimum 
dollar amount, the marital minor or disabled child should take the entire estate. 
This provision is based upon the assumption that a reasonable man would want 
his marital minor or disabled child to inherit to the exclusion of his non-marital 
minor or disabled child if his estate is inadequate for both children to inherit. 
l"bis \VOuld not be unfair to the non-marital minor or disabled child because the 
decedent still has the option of drafting a will to leave property to the non-marital 
minor or disabled child. 
lfthe decedent is divorced or widowed at the time of his death and is survived 
by a non-marital minor or disabled child and a marital minor or disabled child, 
and his estate 1s over a certain dollar amount, the estate should be divided equally 
bet\veen the children. 
ll. Non-marital minor or disabled child vs. marital adult child 
If the decedent is survived by a non-marital minor or disabled child and a 
marital adult child, the statute would establish a rebuttable presumption that the 
non-marital minor or disabled child should take the entire estate to the exclusion 
of the marital adult child. This ts fair because prior to his death, the man had a 
legal obligation to provide financial support for his minor or disabled non-marital 
child.247 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that he would want that child to 
be taken care of after his death. ·ro the contrary, a man has no legal or moral 
duty to support an adult child during his lifetime or to provide for that child upon 
his death. Consequently, a man may disinherit his adult child.248 
246. The electlve share is the portion of the decedent's estate that the surviving spouse takes if 
be dies intestate. THOMAS L SH'<EEER !- r AL .. THI: PI.A'\:\f},'G A'\IJ DRAETl'\(; OF \VIL!$ ANll TRtlS'!S 
75-78 (4th ed. 2001). Se<' also Sharla K. Raab, A Comparative Analysis between the UnifiJrm 
Probate (;ode and Michigan·~ Estates flnd Protected Individuals Code, 79 U. D1,·1 Mf'RCY L. RFv. 
593. 599-603 (2002) (discussing the history and purpose of the elective share provisions). 
247. Rre~lin. supra note 26, at 859-60. 
248 See Brashier, s11pra note 240, at 7-25 (sctnng out 'ix reason-; why the current probate 
system permits parents to disinhent their children). 
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This provision is fair to the marital adult child because that child has the 
opportunity to rebut the presumption. The ability to rebut the presumption is 
important because the decedent's estate may consist of property that the decedent 
inherited from the mother of the marital adult child. Hence, the decedent could 
reasonably prefer that the property go to the marital adult child instead of the 
non-marital minor or disabled child. 
The marital adult child can rebut the presumption by introducing extrinsic 
evidence to prove that the decedent would have wanted the marital adult child to 
inherit to the detriment of the non-marital minor or disabled child. The evidence 
used to rebut the presumption may include proof that the decedent made other 
provisions for the financial support of the non-marital minor or disabled child, 
such as life insurance, inter v1vos trusts, or joint bank accounts. 1'hc marital 
adult child may also introduce evidence of the relationship between the decedent 
and the non-marital minor or disabled child to rebut the presumption that the 
non-marital child should inherit the entire estate. 
iii. ]'./on-marital adult vs. marital minor or disabled child 
If the decedent is survived by a non-marital adult child and a marital minor or 
disabled child, the marital minor or disabled child should inherit the entire estate. 
l'his provision is justified by the state's interest in protecting minor and disabled 
children. It also adheres to the wishes of most reasonable people. An adult child 
is not typically dependent on his or her father for financial support. 1'herefore, it 
is unreasonable for adult children to take to the detriment of minor or disabled 
children. 
iv. Nun-marital child vs. non-marital chi/cf4 '! 
Some factors may justify treating certain non-marital children differently from 
other non-marital children for inheritance purposes. For instance, if a decedent is 
survived by more than one non-marital minor or disabled child, the probate court 
should consider the relationship2 'iO between the decedent and his non-marital 
minor or disabled child. ·rhis approach would promote the goal of distributing a 
decedent's estate in accordance with his presumed intent. Therefore, a non­
marital minor or disabled child kno\Vn to the decedent prior to his death should 
take a greater share of his estate than a non-marital minor or disabled child with 
whom the decedent had no contact. This outcome is reasonable because the 
decedent probably did not provide financial support to the non-marital minor or 
disabled child who was unknown to him. Thus, that child has no expectation of 
continued financial support. However, the unknown non-manta! minor or 
249. Thi' catcgol}' deals with ~ituations V>'here a man has non-n1arital children 'W'ho arc products 
ofh1~ relationships with difTercnt women. 
250. I am not advocating for a system like the Chi11ese systern that evaluates the relationship 
between the decedent and hi> heirs to determine their worth1ne~s to inherit. See franccs H. Foster, 
Totvord1 a Rehavior-Rased Afodel rif lnheruancel: The Chine1e f.Xperitnf!nl. 32 U.C DAVIS L. 
REV. 77, 81-82 (1998). 
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disabled child should not be completely excluded from inheriting from the 
decedent's estate. The decedent nevertheless had a moral and arguably legal 
obligation to provide financial support for the child. 
If a decedent is survived by a non-marital minor or disabled child (who lived 
in the decedent's household prior to his death) and a non-marital minor or 
disabled child (who lived outside of the decedent's household), the non-marital 
minor or disabled children should split the estate. The relationship the decedent 
had with the minor or disabled child who lived in his household suggests giving 
that child preference over the minor or disabled child who lived outside of the 
decedent's household. If the non-marital minor or disabled child who lived in the 
decedent's household is given the entire estate, that child may be unjustly 
enriched. The non-marital minor or disabled child who lived outside of the 
decedent's household is more entitled to inherit from the decedent than the non­
marita\ minor or disabled child who lived in the decedent's household because 
the child who lived with the decedent received more lifetime financial support. 
This reasoning has already been applied by the recognition of advancements that 
may reduce the amount the child of a decedent is entitled to inherit. 251 It is 
therefore equitable for non-marital minor or disabled children to split the estate 
under these circumstances. If a decedent is survived by a non-marital 1ninor or 
disabled child and a non-marital adult child, for the reasons previously stated, the 
non-marital minor or disabled child should inherit the entire estate. 
The purpose of this proposed system is to grant the probate court the flexibility 
it needs to cany out the intent of a reasonable decedent. In deciding how to 
distribute the decedent's estate, the court would have the opportunity to evaluate 
the circumstances of each decedent on a case-by-case basis. As American 
families continue to change, the probate court should be given a certain amount 
of suppleness. My proposal is not meant to interfere with statutory rules that 
provide other benefits for the surviving spouse and dependent child. The system 
I am advocating would only apply to the decedent's remaining property after his 
estate has been reduced, where applicable, by the following statutory allowances: 
homestead,252 personal property set-aside,253 family allowance,254 and dower.255 
251. See Manin L. Fried, The Unifonn Probate Code: /nteslote Succession and Related Mallers, 
55 ALB. L. REv. 927, 936-39 ( 1992) (discussing the impact of the theory of advancements). 
252. A majority of states have enacted homestead laws to award the family home to the 
surviving spouse and minor children free of creditors' claims or to give the surviving spouse a 
homestead exemption. See Gregory J. Duncan, Home Sweet Home? litigation Aspects to 
Minnesota's Descent of Homestead Statute, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 185, 194-200 (2002) 
(describing how the UPC and several states treat the homestead for inheritance purposes). 
253. Some states allow the surviving spouse and dependent children to exclude the decedent's 
tangible personal property up to a certain value from the probate estate. See DUKEM!NIER & 
JOHANSON, supra note 4, at 477. See also John V. Orth, Night Thoughts: Reflections on the Debate 
Concerning Same-Sex Marriage, 3 NEV. L.J. 560, 564 (2003) ("Related to homestead is the right of 
the surviving ~pouse and sometimes of minor children to have set aside from the probate estate 
certain tangible personal property of the deceased spouse up to a certain value."). 
254. In order to provide financial support for the decedent's surviving spouse and dependent 
children while his estate is being probated, the state lcgislarures have enacted statutes giving the 
probate court the authority to award a family allowance. See Foster, supra note 13, at 219-20. 
--------------------- -----------
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V. CONCLUSION 
ln the current climate in the United States, marriage is not a requirement for 
procreation. A woman has various reproductive options. She can have a child 
from a non-marital sexual relationship or through the use of artificial 
insemination. Thus, the number of children being born out of wedlock has 
increased. Historically, non-marital children were not pcnnitted to inherit from 
their fathers. The U.S. Supreme Court and various state legislatures have taken 
actions to expand the inheritance rights of non-marital children. Unfortunately, 
those procedures are complicated and require non-marital children to depend 
upon the affirmative actions of their parents. The UPA introduces a system that 
allows non-marital children to inherit from their fathers on mostly equal terms 
with marital children, but further improvements are needed to fairly treat non­
marital children for inheritance purposes. My proposed system gives the probate 
court flexibility to balance the interests of the state, non-marital children, and 
marital children. This system addresses the proper inclusion of non-marital 
children in intestacy statutes, but would need to be uniformly adopted by the 
states to accommodate family mobility and promote fairness among the states. 
255. Dower entitles the widow to a life estate in one-third of her husband's qualifying land. 
Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn't l Be Allo"'·ed to leave Mv Property to Whomever f l'hoose at 
My Death (Or How f Learned to Stop Worrying and Start loving the French), 44 BRANDEIS LJ. 
737, 738-39 (2006). Only five American states currently recognize the common law form of 
dower. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 4, at 479. See also Ariel R. Dubler, In the 
Shadow o_f Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of the Family and the State, 112 
YALE L.J. 1641, 1669-71 (2003) (discussing the demise of dower). In most states retaining dower, 
the surviving spouse must elect to take dower, or to take a statutory share of the decedent's estate, 
or to take a share under the decedent's will. See Raab, supra note 246, at 600. 
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